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I. INTRODUCTION

In issuing a writ of certiorari in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing
Displays, Inc.,' the Supreme Court directly confronted an issue that has
lurked in trade dress law since its emergence in the late nineteenth century,
namely, the extent to which trade dress protection may attach to a design
addressed by a utility patent.2 The Court's ultimate holding on the merits
of the case predictably invalidated a claim to trade dress protection of a
device allegedly disclosed by two expired utility patents secured by the
plaintiff s principal. 3 In reaching this result, however, the Court abandoned
its traditional doctrinal framework for disposing of trade dress disputes
involving related utility patents in favor of a more modem paradigm
grounded in opinions from the lower federal courts.'
This Article critically examines the Court's opinion in TrafFix, with a
particular emphasis on the appropriate methodology for constructing and
applying the disclosure of utility patents in cases in which plaintiffs seek
trade dress protection in designs related to the patents. Part II of this Article
examines the federal utility patent regime and its role in the competitive
process, with a particular focus on the rules governing the construction and
application of utility patent claims arising from the Federal Circuit's and
Supreme Court's opinions in Markman v. Westview Instruments,Inc.5 Part
III surveys the emergence and evolution of federal trade dress doctrine over
the past one-and-a-half centuries. Part IV addresses the role that utility
patents historically have played in trade dress litigation. Part V reviews the
three opinions in the Trajix litigation itself and their varying treatment of
the claims recited in the plaintiff s utility patents. Parts VI and VII examine
the likely effects of the Supreme Court's TrafFix opinion on the Court's
own jurisprudence in the area. Finally, Part VIII proposes a framework for
construing and applying patent claims that better accommodates the
concerns raised by the possible extension of trade dress protection to a
design addressed by the disclosure of a utility patent than does the
methodology of the TrafFix Court.

1. 121 S.Ct. 1255 (2001).
2. Id. at 1258-59.
3. Id. at 1263.
4. See id. at 1260-63.

5. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Markman 1), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)
(Markman I).
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II. FEDERAL UTILITY PATENT DOCTRINE

A. The Constitutionaland Statutory Foundationsof Federal
Utility PatentLaw
In contrast to many bodies of federal law, the patent regime has roots
firmly grounded in the nation's organic law. Under the Constitution's
Patent and Copyright Clause, Congress is authorized "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." 6 Notwithstanding this broad language, this clause "is both a
grant of power and a limitation.... The Congress in the exercise of the
patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated
constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without
regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby."7
Thus, as the Supreme Court has explained of the underpinnings of the
utility patent system:
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second,
it promotes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further
innovation and to permit the public to practice the invention
once the patent expires; third, the stringent requirements for
patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain
remain there for the free use of the public.'
Although Congress has exercised its plenary authority under the
Constitution to extend protection to several categories of "useful Arts,"9 the
most significant legislative and judicial activity in the area historically has
addressed utility patents. This variety of patent is authorized by section 101
of the Federal Patent Act, which provides that "[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title."'" The most significant of these categories, in turn, historically has

6. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.
8.
7. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966).
8. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
9. For example, the federal patent statutes provide for the possible protection of
nonfunctional designs of articles of manufacture. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000). Outside of the
context of the patent system, Congress also has provided for the protection of certain "new,"
"distinct," "uniform," and "stable" sexually reproduced varieties of plants. See 7 U.S.C. § 2402

(2000).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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been that of "machines," which includes "every mechanical device or
combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function
and produce a certain effect or result."' 11
Not all machines are eligible for utility patent protection, however.
Section 101 on its face requires that an invention possess both novelty and
utility.to be patentable. 2 Likewise, section 103 requires the invention to
represent a nonobvious development over the prior art. 13 Finally, on a more
procedural note, section 102 contains a statutory prohibition on the
patenting of inventions that were publicly disclosed more than a year prior
to the filing of applications addressing them. 4
The substantive requirements of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness
cannot be lightly addressed by prospective patentees. For example,
although section 101 mandates that applicants demonstrate the novelty of
their designs, it is section 102's provisions that give teeth to this
requirement. Specifically, section 102(a) disqualifies from protection any
invention "known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant."'" Similarly, section 102(e)(2) bars the
issuance of a patent to a device "described... in a patent granted on an
application for [a] patent by another filed in the United States before the
invention [thereof] by the applicant for patent."'16 Finally, section 102(g)
prohibits utility patent protection for any device that "before [the
applicant's] invention thereof ...was made in this country by another
inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it."' 7 These bars
roughly approximate the test for infringement of the patent once it has
issued: "That which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if earlier."' 8
The second requirement for patentability, that of utility, is equally
significant, but less demanding. A prospective patentee must do more than
allege that its product might be useful for an as-of-yet unknown
application. 9 Nevertheless, utility in the patent sense does not necessarily
mean that the device in question possesses attributes superior to those of
competitive devices.2" As Justice Story explained as early as 1817:

II. Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267 (1853).
12. 35 U.S.C. § 101.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. § 103.
Id. § 102.
Id. § 102(a).
Id. § 102(e)(2).
Id. § 102(g).
Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889).
See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966).

20. See In re Ratti, 270 F.2d 810 (C.C.P.A. 1959) (holding that superiority over prior art is

not an element of the utility requirement); see also Exparte Cheesebrough, 1869 Dec. Comm'n Pat.
18, 19 (1869) ("[U]tility ...refers.., to a utility of purpose [rather] than a utility of means.").
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All that the law requires is, that the invention should not be
frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound
morals of society. The word "useful," therefore is incorporated
into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or immoral....
But if the invention steers wide of these objections, whether it
be more or less useful is a circumstance very material to the
interests of the patentee, but of no importance to the public. If
it be not extensively useful, it will silently sink into contempt
and disregard."
Thus, a "[f]inding that an invention is an 'improvement' is not a
prerequisite to patentability. It is possible for an invention to be less
effective than existing devices but nevertheless meet the statutory criteria
for patentability." 2 '
Like the novelty requirement, the third prerequisite for protection,
nonobviousness, "[is] grounded in the notion that concepts within the
public grasp, or those so obvious that they readily could be, are the tools of
creation available to all."' Even prior to its formal codification in 1952, the
nonobviousness requirement existed in much the same form as it does
today in section 103.24 For example, as early as 1851, the Supreme Court
rejected a claim to patentability of a putative inventor who had merely
substituted materials found in a prior device:
[U]nless more ingenuity and skill... were required than were
possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the
business, there was an absence of that degree of skill and
ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every
invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the
skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.25
As it has evolved, the nonobviousness prerequisite requires a tripartite
inquiry into: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences
between the claimed invention and the prior art; and (3) a determination of
the level of ordinary skill in the prior art.26 If a comparison of the claimed
invention to the prior art fails to disclose an "exercise of the inventive
faculty" separating the two,2 7 then protection may be unavailable, as
21.
22.
1986).
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568).
Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., 807 F.2d 955, 960 n.12 (Fed. Cir.
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989).
See generally Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (I I How.) 248, 267 (1850).
See Graham,383 U.S. at 17.
See Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 37, 41 (1875).
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"[a]rticles of manufacture may be new in the
commercial sense when they
28
law.
patent
the
of
sense
the
in
new
not
are
On one level, these prerequisites for patentability might be viewed as
mere creatures of the statutes upon which they are based. On another level,
however, "[t]he novelty and nonobviousness requirements of patentability
[in particular] embody a congressional understanding, implicit in the Patent
[and Copyright] Clause itself,that free exploitation of ideas will be the rule,
to which the protection of a federal patent is the exception." 9
B. The Structure of Utility Patents
Utility patents consist of two components: the specification and the
claims. The specification of a utility patent, which includes any drawings
submitted by the patentee, discloses the invention and how to make and use
it. 0 The requirement of a specification, which has been a hallmark of U.S.
law since the original Patent Act of 1790,"' is codified in section 112 of the
current Patent Act:
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using
it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall

28. Collar Co. v. Van Dusen, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 530, 562 (1875).
29. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Crafts Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
30. According to the Supreme Court:
The specification ... has two objects: one is to make known the manner of
constructing the machine (if the invention is of a machine)[,] so as to enable
artizans [sic] to make and use it, and thus to give the public the full benefit of the
discovery[,] after the expiration of the patent. . . . The other object of the
specification is, to put the public in possession of what the party claims as his own
invention, so as to ascertain if he claim[s] anything that is in common use, or is
already known, and to guard against prejudice or injury from the use of an
invention which the party may otherwise innocently suppose not to be patented.
It is, therefore, for the purpose of warning an innocent purchaser[,J or other person
using a machine, of his infringement of the patent; and at the same time[,] of
taking from the inventor the means of practising [sic] upon the credulity or the
fears of other persons, by pretending that his invention is more than what it really
is, or different from its ostensible objects, that the patentee is required to
distinguish his invention in his specification[s].
Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 433-34 (1822).
31. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110-11.
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set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention."
Assuming that the specification meets these requirements, it shall be
accompanied by "one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention. 33 "[T]he claims must be reasonably clearcut to enable courts to
determine whether novelty and invention are genuine";34 consequently, they
must be particular and distinct.3 For purposes of defining the patent's
scope, the claims are the most important; the specification enters the
analysis "only for the purpose of enabling [the court] correctly to interpret
the claim[s]." 36 Nevertheless, "[c]laims are not interpreted in a vacuum, but
' Thus,
are part of and are read in light of the specification."37
[t]he role of the specification includes presenting a description
of the technologic subject matter of the invention, while the
role of claims is to point out with particularity the subject
matter that is patented. The claims are directed to the
invention that is described in the specification; they do not
have meaning removed from the context from which they
arose. Thus the claims are construed to state the legal scope of
each patented invention, on [the] examination ofthe language
of the claims, the description in the specification, and the
prosecution history.38
Because of the potential for its ultimate placement into the public
domain, the scope of a utility patent's subject matter often turns upon its
prosecution history. Few utility patent applications are granted in their
entirety; rather, it is far more common for the Patent and Trademark Office
examiner to determine that the claimed invention or process fails to meet
the statutory requirements for patentability.39 If such a rejection occurs, the
applicant may either contest the determination on the merits or,
alternatively, amend its application to narrow its claims and therefore
escape negative application of the nonobviousness and novelty

32. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
33. Id.
34. United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942).
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 112.
36. Brooks v. Fiske, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 212, 215 (1853).
37. Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., 810 F.2d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
38. Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted).
39. See Thomas K. Landry, CertaintyandDiscretion in PatentLaw: The On Sale Bar,the
DoctrineofEquivalents,andJudicialPower in the FederalCircuit,67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1201

n.254 (1994).
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requirements.4" The history of these negotiations, including amendments,
statements by the applicant and the examiner, and responses to rejections,
are memorialized as the "file wrapper" of the application.4 ' In light of the
importance of the prosecution history to the scope and validity of the
resulting patent, the drafting of utility patent applications has long been a
"highly developed art of drafting patent claims so that they disclose as little
useful information as possible-while broadening the scope of the claim[s]
'
as widely as possible."42
C. Determining andApplying Rights Under the Utility Patent
Statutes: The Markman Methodology
As the complexity of both the claim drafting process and the
examination procedures might suggest, determinations of the constitutional
and statutory bases of the federal utility patent regime often take a back seat
to two other, more pedestrian inquiries in patent infringement litigation:
what the patentee's rights are under its patent, and whether the defendant
has violated those rights. The framework governing the resolution of these
issues has its foundation in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 43 in
which the Supreme Court reaffirmed the proposition that utility patent
claim construction presents a question of pure law.44 In doing so, the Court
held that the Seventh Amendment does not extend to litigants the right to
have claims construed by a jury.45 Coupled with the Federal Circuit's
restrictive approach, at an earlier stage in the same case, to the materials
appropriately considered by district courts in the claim construction
process, 46 the ultimate result is a methodology aimed at resolving
complicated technical issues without ever having them reach a jury.
1. Markman and the Claim Construction Process
Markman involved a utility patent issued to the inventor of an inventory
control system used in the dry cleaning industry.47 The case began as a
standard infringement action, in which the plaintiff patentee challenged a

40. See generally RONALD B. HILDREDTH, PATENT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 30-34

(1988).
41. See Sean T. Moorhead, Note, The Doctrine ofEquivalents: RarelyActionable Non-Literal
Infringement or the Second Prong ofPatent Infringement Charges?,53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1421, 1442
(1992).
42. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
43. Markman 11, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
44. See generally id.
45. Id.at 372.
46. See generally Markman 1,52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
47. Id.at 971.
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competitor's use of a similar system." Although the district court initially
charged the jury with responsibility for determining the scope of the claims
of the plaintiffs patent, it reached a different conclusion following a
verdict of infringement." Considering the defendant's JMOL motion, on
which it had deferred action earlier, the district court undertook its own
inquiry into the patent's claims and ultimately concluded that the defendant
was entitled to a directed verdict."0 In doing so, the court declined to accord
dispositive weight to testimony given by the inventor and by a practicing
patent attorney as to the meaning of the patent's claims.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld this methodology in a lengthy en
banc opinion on the ground that the district court properly had treated
construction of the patent's claims as a question of law.52 The appellate
court began its analysis by asserting that:
The reason that the courts construe patent claims as a
matter of law and should not give such task to the jury as a
factual matter is straightforward: It has long been and
continues to be a fundamental principle of American law that
"the construction of a written evidence is exclusively with the
court."
The patent is a fully integrated written instrument.... It
follows, therefore, from the general rule applicable to written
instruments that a patent is uniquely suited for having its
meaning and scope determined entirely by a court as a matter
of law."
The Federal Circuit then took up the plaintiff s proffered trial testimony
on the scope of the patent's claims.54 Building on earlier case law to similar
effect, 55 it held that this testimony fell within the category of "extrinsic"
evidence, which it considered to be "all evidence external to the patent and
prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries,

48. Id.
49. Id. at 973.

50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 967.
53. Id. at 978 (quoting Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 180, 186 (1805)) (citations
omitted).
54. Id. at 983.
55. See. e.g., Schneider (USA) Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072, 1074 (D.
Minn. 1993) ("In this case the Court finds that there is no need to look beyond the words of the
claims to define the scope of the claims."); Nat'l Bus. Sys., Inc. v. AM Int'l, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 340,
348 (N.D. II. 1982) ("Since there is no ambiguity on the face of [the c]laim ... the Court is to read
the claim alone as the measure of the invention."), affd and remanded,743 F.2d 1227 (7th Cir.
1984).
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and learned treatises."56 Although the district court properly had admitted
the testimony of the two witnesses, it just as properly had disregarded the
substance of the testimony on the merits. As the Federal Circuit noted,
"[e]xtrinsic evidence is to be used for the court's understanding of the
patent, not for the purpose of varying or contradicting the terms of the
claims."5 " For the same reason, the appellate court also concluded that the
trial court had not erred in declining to accord weight to the plaintiff's
advertising materials.5 8
Although granting the plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari from the
en banc Federal Circuit opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the removal
of the patent's construction from the jury with a tripartite analysis. s9 First,
the Court determined that no right to ajury trial on analogous issues existed
at the time of the ratification of the Seventh Amendment.6 0 Second, it
appeared that case law following the ratification of the Seventh
Amendment favored treating claim construction as a purely legal
enterprise.6 Third, the nature of claim construction itself was a "functional
consideration" warranting action by a court, rather than a jury:
The construction of written instruments is one of those
things that judges often do and are likely to do better than
jurors unburdened by training in exegesis. Patent construction
in particular "is a special occupation, requiring, like all others,
special training and practice. The judge, from his training and
discipline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation to such
instruments than a jury; and he is, therefore, more likely to be
right, in performing such a duty, than a jury can be expected
to be."
... We accordingly think that there is a sufficient reason to
treat construction of terms of art like many other
responsibilities that we cede to ajudge in the normal course of
trial, notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings.62

The Court therefore upheld the removal of the construction of the patent
from the jury.63

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
10,740)).
63.

Markman I, 52 F.3d at 980.
Id. at 981.
Id. at 983.
See generally Markman I1,
517 U.S. 370 (1996).
Id. at 376-83.
Id. at 383-88.
Id. at 388-90 (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No.
Id. at 391.
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The Supreme Court's opinion did not comment on the Federal Circuit's
treatment of extrinsic evidence, however, and the lower court's subsequent
decisions on the subject appeared to leave doubt that the latter's bright-line
rule was subject to exceptions, particularly if the claims at issue were
amnbiguous.6 For example, in Fromson v. Anitec PrintingPlates,Inc.,65 the
Federal Circuit held that the patentee appropriately had relied on expert
witness testimony to "enhance" the trial court's understanding of the use
of the term "anodization" in the patent's claims. 66 Similarly, the same court
concluded four years after its opinion in Markman I that "it is entirely
appropriate, perhaps even preferable, for a court to consult trustworthy
extrinsic evidence to ensure that the claim construction . . . is not
inconsistent with clearly expressed, plainly apposite, and widely held
understandings in the pertinent technical field. 67
Nevertheless, the court subsequently has disavowed statements such as
these68 and has returned to its core holding in Markman I, namely, the
proposition that even in cases in which it is properly invoked to clarify a
patent's claims, material outside of the patent's file wrapper history cannot
amend those claims. 69 "Claim interpretation is the process of giving proper
meaning to the claim language. Claim language, after all, defines claim
scope.... Therefore, the language of the claim frames and ultimately

64. "In most situations, an analysis ofthe intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity
in a disputed claim term." Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
65. 132 F.3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
66. Id. at 1444.
67. Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
68. See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
69. As the court has explained:
[T]he language of the claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of claim
interpretation. In determining the meaning of disputed claim terms, however,
a construing court considers the written descriptions, the prosecution history,
and extrinsic evidence.... These additional sources provide a context to
Nevertheless, throughout the
illuminate the meaning of claim terms ....
interpretation process, the focus remains on the meaning of claim language.
Thermalloy, Inc. v. Aavid Eng'g, Inc., 121 F.3d 691, 692-93 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted);
see also Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1333, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[I]fthe
claim is susceptible to a broader and a narrower meaning, and the narrower one is clearly supported
by the intrinsic evidence while the broader one raises questions of enablement... ,we will adopt
the narrower of the two."); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547,
1555 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Extrinsic evidence-whether providing context for the claims or explaining
meaning to one of skill in the art-cannot contradict claim language."); Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Allowing the public record to be altered
or changed by extrinsic evidence introduced at trial, such as expert testimony, would make th[e]
right [to ascertain the scope of the claimed invention from the claims] meaningless.").
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resolves all issues of claim interpretation."7' Thus, because "[c]laims may
not be construed one way in order to obtain their allowance and in a
different way against accused infringers,"'" courts are "forbidden from
considering extrinsic evidence that alters the meaning of claim terms as
they appear in the patent documents."72
2. Markman and the Infringement Analysis
Critically, neither the Supreme Court in Markman II nor the Federal
Circuit in Markman I held all aspects of utility patent infringement
proceedings to be questions of law. As the Federal Circuit explained in
Markman I, "[a]n infringement analysis entails two steps. The first step is
determining the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be
infringed. The second step is comparing the properly construed claims to
the device accused of infringing."'73 In this latter undertaking, infringement
"is determined by comparing an accused product not with a preferred
embodiment described in the specification, or with a commercialized
embodiment ofthe patentee, but with the properly and previously construed
claims in suit."74
The comparison of a patent's claims to the device actually marketed by
the defendant may yield a finding of infringement under one or both oftwo
theories. First, the accused device may literally infringe the plaintiffs
patent.75 "To prove literal infringement, the patentee must show that the
accused device contains every limitation in the asserted claims. If even one
limitation is missing or not met as claimed, there is no literal infringement."76 Literal infringement traditionally has been regarded as a question
of fact."
Second, because of the ease with which a defendant may avoid liability
for literal infringement, 7 a plaintiff alternatively may establish infringement through the "doctrine of equivalents." Under this approach, even if
an accused device does not literally correspond to the terms of a patent
claim, infringement may be found if the accused device contains an

70. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
71. Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
72. Rolite, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Techs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 870, 874 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
73. Markman I, 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
74. SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc).
75. See, e.g., Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
76. WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting
Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
77. See, e.g., Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
78. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) ("One
who seeks to pirate an invention ... may be expected to introduce minor variations to conceal and
shelter the piracy. Outright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of infringement.").
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equivalent of each claimed element of the patent.79 To establish liability
under the doctrine of equivalents, the patentee must show that the accused
device incorporates an element that performs substantially the same
function, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same
result, as each element of the patented device. 80 Liability under the doctrine
of equivalents also may be possible if respective elements of the parties'
devices play substantially the same role.81 As is the case with the literal
infringement inquiry, the existence of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents is a question of fact.82
Indeed, the factual nature of the infringement inquiry methodology-the
comparison of the patent's claims to the accused device-went unaltered
by both the Federal Circuit's and the Supreme Court's opinions in the
Markman cases. In contrast to the historical pedigree of claim construction
practice, the application of a patent's claims to the accused device always
has been considered a factual inquiry reserved for the jury. 3 Indeed, utility
patent doctrine both before and after the Markman cases always has
preserved the right of litigants to jury trials on this issue. 8' As the Federal
Circuit noted in Markman I, "[o]ur opinion merely holds that part of the
infringement inquiry, construing and determining the scope of the claims
in a patent, is strictly a legal question for the court. 85 In contrast to this
holding, "[t]he patentee's right to a jury trial on the application of the
properly construed claim to the accused device is preserved as it was in
1791. ",86 Thus, "there is no dispute that infringement cases today must be
tried to a jury, as their predecessors were more than two centuries ago. 87
III. THE EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL
TRADE DRESS DocTRiNE
Notwithstanding their express contemplation of federal patent and
copyright regimes in the Constitution, the founding fathers were far less

79. See generally Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21, 39

(1997).
80. See id. at 21; see also Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
81. See Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. at 39-40.
82. See Bai, 160 F.3d at 1354.
83. See generally Gregory D. Leibold, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of
Patent-InfringementLitigation,67 U. COLO.L. REV. 623 (1996) (arguing that the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit has taken questions of fact away from the jury despite the fact that precedent
mandates such questions be reserved for the jury).
84. See, e.g., SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("It
is settled that the question of infringement (literal or by equivalents) is factual.").
85. Markman 1,52 F.3d 967, 984 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
86. Id.
87. Markman II, 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996).
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concerned about codifying the protection of brand names. 8 Not only is the
Constitution silent on the subject, Congress did not enact the first piece of
federal trademark legislation until after the Civil War, and even then it left
intact the bodies of state and even local regulation that characterized the
field. 9 Moreover, the emergence of federal unfair competition doctrine
suffered a substantial blow in 1879, when the Supreme Court invalidated
the Trademark Acts of 187090 and 1876, 9' which Congress had enacted
under the auspices of the Patent and Copyright Clause. As the Court noted
of the eligibility of marks for protection under this provision of the
Constitution: "The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to
invention or discovery. The trade-mark recognized by the common law is
generally the growth of a considerable period of use, rather than a sudden
invention.... It requires.., no laborious thought. It is simply founded on
priority of appropriation [of use]., 92 Although offering a thinly-veiled
suggestion to Congress that the Commerce Clause 93 might serve as a valid
basis for future legislation in the area, 94 the Court's holding sufficiently
muted congressional enthusiasm for trademark protection so that the next
piece of federal legislation authorized protection only for marks used in
commerce with foreign nations or Native American tribes. 9
This relative absence of federal legislation, however, did little to inhibit
the development of a common law of unfair competition that protected
plaintiffs' brand names against uses of confusingly similar imitations by
their competitors.96 Of equal importance, the common law soon began to

88. Although Secretary of StateThomas Jefferson envisioned a system "permitting the owner
of every manufactory to enter in the record of the [federal] court district wherein his manufactory
is, the name with which he chooses to mark or designate his wares, and rendering it penal to others
to put the same mark on any other wares," this proposal was never acted upon by Congress. See
EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOOD "WILL, TRADE-MARKS, AND UNFAIR TRADING 47-48 (1914).

Registration with local courts therefore was the primary option for mark owners anxious to protect
their property: "In 1772, George Washington, then only a farmer and businessman, went to the
[Fairfax County, Virginia] court to get a trademark [registration] for his brand of flour, which he
proposed to name, simply 'G. Washington.' The presiding Justices so ordered." Thomas Grubisich,
Washington'sFlour: CourtRecords of the 1700sPut in Order,CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 23, 1976, at
46.
89. One leading commentator observed as late as 1936 that "the common law and not the
federal statute is the principal source of the law of trademarks." WALTER J. DERENBERG, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING 14 (1936).
90. Act of July 8, 1870, 41 Cong., ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1870).
91. Act of Aug. 14, 1878, 44 Cong., ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141 (1878).
92. United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
93. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
94. See Steffens, 100 U.S. at 95-96.
95. Act of March 3, 1881, 46 Cong., ch. 138, § 3, 21 Stat. 502 (repealed 1946).
96. See, e.g., Ellis v. J.H. Zeilin & Co., 42 Ga. 91, 93 (1871).
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recognize that brand signals could consist of more than ordinary words. For
example, as early as 1871, the Supreme Court explained that:
The first appropriator of a name or device pointing to his
ownership, or which, by being associated with articles of
trade, has acquired an understood reference to the
originator, or manufacturer of the articles, is injured
whenever another adopts the same name or device for
similar articles, because such adoption is in effect
representing falsely that the productions of the latter are
those of the former.97
Other courts applying the tort of unfair competition went further, and cases
protecting the non-verbal aspects of the appearance of product labels soon
became routine.98
Eventually, Congress began to expand the protection available to
nonverbal designations of origin. Although prior federal trademark
legislation had restricted itself to the protection of registered "marks," the
Trademark Act of 1920 conspicuously afforded protection to unregistered
"designation[s] of origin."9 9 The 1946 Lanham Act went further in its
definition of "trademark," which encompassed "any word, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof,"'100 and in its recognition of
protection for the same categories of brand signals under its section
43(a). 0 ' And, in passing the 1988 Trademark Law Revision Act, 02
Congress noted its approval of the judicial expansion
of section 43(a) to
03
reach unconventional designations of origin.1
By the time that the Supreme Court began to revisit the subject in 1992
after a hiatus of nearly three decades,'0 4 these unconventional designations
97. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 323 (1871) (emphasis added).
98. See, e.g., Centaur Co. v. Neathery, 91 F. 891, 900 (5th Cir. 1898); Thedford Med. Co.
v. Curry, 22 S.E. 661, 663 (Ga. 1895); Fischer v. Blank, 33 N.E. 1040, 1041 (N.Y. 1893).
99. Trade Mark Act of 1920, 66th Cong., ch. 104, § 3, 41 Stat. 534. Section 3 of the 1920 Act
provided: "That any person who shall willfully and with intent to deceive, affix, apply, or annex,
or use in connection with any article or articles of merchandise, or any container or containers of
the same, a false designation of origin .... shall be liable to an action at law for damages and to an

action in equity for an injunction." Id.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).

101. See id. § 1125(a).
102. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935.
103. See S. REP. No. 100-515, at 40 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603.
("[Section 43(a)] has been applied to cases involving the infringement of unregistered marks,
violations of trade dress and certain nonfunctional configurations of goods....").
104. Notwithstanding its traditional willingness to hear trade dress cases, the Court did not
opine on the subject between its 1964 opinions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S.
225 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Co., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), and its 1992
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had a new doctrinal name: "trade dress," or in other words, the overall
image used to present a product or service."0 5 In addition to packaging,0 6
its most common form, 0 7 trade dress protection can also attach to
individual colors and color combinations, '" fragrances, 0 9 the physical
appearance of buildings associated with the plaintiff's services,"° sounds,
unique sales techniques,' 12 and product configurations." 3
opinion in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
105. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 764 n.l.
106. See, e.g., Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Imports. &Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 586 (2d Cir.
1993) (ouzo bottle configuration); NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1025-26 (7th Cir.
1990) (packaging for artificial sweetener); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1541 (11 th
Cir. 1986) (foil wrapper for frozen ice cream bar); Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research &Dev.,
Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 190 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (exterior of suntan lotion bottle); S.C. Johnson &
Son v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1278, 1313-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (shaving cream can).
107. "[T]he majority of trade dress claims involve a manufacturer's container or packaging
for a product." Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821,831 (11th Cir.
1982).
108. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995) (green-gold
color associated with plaintiffs dry cleaning press pads); Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986
F.2d 219, 220 (8th Cir. 1993) (blue splicing tape); In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d
1116, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (pink fiberglass insulation).
109. See In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1239 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
110. For representative cases addressing the protectability of building appearance as trade
dress under the federal Lanham Act, see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763
(1992); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doe's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1987); Prufrock Ltd.
v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1986); T.G.I. Friday's, Inc. v. Int'l Rest. Group, Inc., 569 F.2d
895 (5th Cir. 1978); McDonald's Corp. v. Moore, 363 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966); WhiteTower Sys.,
Inc. v. White Castle Sys. of Eating Houses Corp., 90 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1937); Morton v. Rank Am.,
Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1062 (C.D. Cal. 1993); House of Hunan, Inc. v. Hunan at Pavilion, 227 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 803, 805-06 (D.D.C. 1985); Warehouse Rest., Inc. v. Customs House Rest., Inc., 217
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 411,419 (N.D. Cal. 1982); see also Weinstock, Lubin & Co. v. Marks, 42 P. 142,
145 (Cal. 1895) (enjoining use of putative distinctive building design under California common
law).
111. See In re Gen. Elec. Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560 (T.T.A.B. 1978).
112. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 831 (1Ith Cir.
1982).
113. See, e.g., Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(furniture); Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993) (configuration of water faucet);
Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993) (configuration of fishing
pole); Merchant& Evans v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1992) (configuration
of roofing materials); Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)
(configuration ofelectric lamp); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1987)
(configuration of fishing reel cover); Le Sportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985)
(appearance of gym bag); Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854 (11th Cir.
1983) ("V" design affixed to side of running shoe); John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc.,
711 F.2d 966 (1 th Cir. 1983) (appearance of bank checks); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (appearance of cheerleaders' uniforms);
Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977)
(design of chicken cartons and napkins); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210
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Under sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 14 as well as under the
common law," 5 a plaintiff with prior use in commerce of a valid trade
dress" 6 may bring an infringement suit against a junior user of a
confusingly similar dress. To qualify for protection against infringement,
the claimant must prove that its trade dress is (1) a distinctive indicator of
origin".7 and (2) "nonfunctional," meaning not essential to the use or
purpose of the associated good or service or affecting the cost or quality of
the good or service.' 18 To bring an action for dilution under section 43(c)
of the Lanham Act 19 and the laws of slightly more than half the states, 2 '

(8th Cir. 1976) (shape of truck trailer); Alum-A-Fold Shutter Corp. v. Folding Shutter Corp., 441
F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1971) (configuration of aluminum shutters).
114. Section 32 of the Lanham Act creates a cause of action on behalf of the owner of a
federally registered trade dress against anyone who, without consent, uses a "reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation" of the registered trade dress. 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(1)(a)
(2000). Similarly, section 43(a) of the Act allows the owners of registered or unregistered trade
dresses to bring infringement actions against defendants using "false designation[s] of origin." Id.
§ 1125(a)(1).
115. See, e.g., Huston v. Barrett, 142 S.E. 736, 738 (Ga. 1928) (enjoining defendant's
imitation of plaintiff's packaging).
116. As the Restatement explains:
Rights can be acquired in a designation only when the designation has been
actually used as a [trade dress]... or when an applicable statutory provision
recognizes a protectable interest in the designation prior to actual use. A
designation is "used" as a [trade dress] ... when the designation is displayed or
otherwise made known to prospective purchasers in the ordinary course of
business in a manner that associates the designation with the goods, services, or
btsiness of the user ....
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18 (1995); see also Haymaker Sports, Inc. v.
Turian, 581 F.2d 257, 261 (C.C.P.A. 1978) ("The owner of a trade-mark may not, like the
proprietor of a patented invention, make a negative and merely prohibitive use of it as a
monopoly."), As this language suggests, since the enactment of the Trademark Law Revision Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, federal law has permitted the filing of applications
to register particular designations of origin on the basis of an intent to use, rather than actual use.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2000). Even under the revised Lanham Act, however, intent to use
applications can mature into registrations only after applicants demonstrate use oftheir designations
in interstate commerce. See id § 1051(d).
117. See, e.g., Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 857-62 (11th Cir.
1983) (affirming denial of relief in light of plaintiffs failure to prove distinctiveness of alleged
trade dress).
118. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.10 (1982); see also Qualitex
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 169 (1995); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 769 (1992).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2000).
120. See ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (2001); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.180 (Michie 2001); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 44-1448.01(2001); ARK. CODEANN. § 4-71-113 (Michie 2001); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 14330 (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-1 li(c) (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §
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which do not require a showing of likely confusion, a claimant must make
beyond that normally necessary to
an additional showing of distinctiveness
2
establish a protectable trade dress.1 1
IV. THE HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF UTILITY PATENTS IN
TRADE DRESS LITIGATION

All too often in the history of unfair competition law, particularly where
product configurations are concerned, utility patent law in one way or
another has posed an obstacle to trade dress protection. In the early
development of trade dress doctrine, it was the absence, rather than the
presence, of an extant utility patent that led to denials of relief. For
example, one 1870 opinion rejected the trade dress claims of a plow
manufacturer with the observation that "the inventors have no patent upon
any portion of their plows; any one, therefore, has the perfect right to make
plows in their exact similitude, even to the curve of the mould board and
the tip of the handles-in the minutest, as well as in the most important
points .... ,,122 Another court explained its refusal to extend protection by
holding that "[i]n the absence of protection by patent, no person can
monopolize or appropriate to the exclusion of others elements of
3313 (2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451(b) (2001);
IDAHO CODE § 48-512 (Michie 2001); 765 ILL. COM. STAT. 1035/65 (West 2001); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 548.112 (West 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:223.1 (West 2002); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 1530 (West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110B, § 12 (West 2001); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 325D. 165 (West 2000) (repeated); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-25-25 (2001); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 417.061(1) (West2001); MONT. CODEANN. § 30-13-334 (West2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-140
(2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A: 12 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:3-13.20 (West 2002);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3B-15 (Michie 2001); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 360-I (McKinney 1996); OR.
REV. STAT. § 647.107 (1999); 54PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1124 (West2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-212 (2001); S.C. CODEANN. § 39-15-1165 (2001); TENN. CODEANN. § 47-25-512 (2001); TEx.Bus.
& COM. CODEANN. § 16.29 (Vernon 2001); WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 19.77.140 (West 2001); W.
VA. CODE § 47-2-13 (2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-115 (Michie 2001).
121. As the First Circuit has explained:
Both the text and legislative history of the original bill in 1988 and the FTDA
itself indicate a congressional intent that courts should be discriminating and
selective in categorizing a mark as famous.
Both the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition and the state antidilution statutes against the background of which Congress enacted the FTDA
make clear that the standard for fame and distinctiveness required to obtain antidilution protection is more rigorous than that required to seek infringement
protection.
I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 46-47 (1st Cir. 1998).
122. Candee, Swan & Co. v. Deere & Co., 54 Ill. 439,461 (1870) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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mechanical construction which are essential to the successful practical
operation of a manufacture, or which primarily serve to promote its
efficiency for the purpose to which it is devoted."' 2' As the Eighth Circuit
explained this rule, "[a]ny article, structure or design, which is unpatented,
may accordingly be imitated or appropriated in its functional aspects, if no
unfair competition [e.g., actual palming off] is involved in the manner of
its use."' 2 4
With the increasing phenomenon of claimants seeking to secure trade
dress protection following the expiration of utility patents, a second line of
cases soon emerged that focused on the existence, rather than the absence,
of a prior patent.'25 One leading example of this methodology occurred in
the Supreme Court's opinion in Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June
Manufacturing Co.:26
It is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the
monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make
the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public
property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted. It
follows, as a matter of course, that on the termination of the
patent there passes to the public the right to make the machine
127
in the form in which it was constructed during the patent.
Thus, "the entry of one manufacturer into the 12field at the expiration of [a]
patent is perfectly legitimate and justifiable."'
There are two possible explanations underlying the theory that utility
patent protection will preclude a finding of protectable trade dress in the
same subject matter. One, as suggested by the language from Singer quoted
above, is simply that the bargain inherent in the government's extension of
a utility patent mandates the public's access to the underlying design

123. Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161 (2d Cir. 1904).
124. J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 953-54 (8th Cir. 1941).
125. See In re Shenango Ceramics, Inc., 362 F.2d 287,292 (C,C.P.A. 1966) ("In the absence
of other valid patent claims, a feature that is the subject of a utility patent goes into the public
domain when the patent expires.... Such a feature, being free to be used by any person, thus
cannot be a trademark.... "(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); In re Shakespeare
Co., 289 F.2d 506, 508 (C.C.P.A. 1961) ("[W]hen thepatent expires, freedom to utilize that process
and whatever advantages it may have is a public right which cannot be interfered with by alleged
trademark rights."); Lon Tai Shing Co. v. Koch + Lowy, 19 U.SP.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1100
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("If a product is not patentable or if its patent has expired, the policy of promoting
free competition embodied in the patent laws suggests that the product should not be entitled to
protection from competitors and certainly should not receive protection in perpetuity, which may
be the effect of the invocation of trademark law."),
126. 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
127. Ica at 185.
128. William H. Keller, Inc. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 298 F. 52, 57 (7th Cir. 1923).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 54

' According to the
following the expiration or invalidation of that grant. 29
Supreme Court:

By the force of the patent laws not only is the invention
[underlying] a patent dedicated to the public upon its
expiration, but the public thereby becomes entitled to share in
the good will which the patentee has built up in the patented
article or product through the enjoyment of his patent
monopoly....
[.
[T]he
patent laws preclude the patentee of an expired
patent and all others ... from recapturing any part of the
former patent monopoly; for those laws dedicate to all the
public the ideas and inventions embodied in an expired patent.
They do not contemplate that anyone... may withhold from
the public the use of an invention for which the public has
paid by its grant of a monopoly and which has been
appropriated to the use of all. 30
Thus, "it [is] well established that in the case of an expired patent, the
federal patent laws do create a federal right to 'copy and to use"' 31 and that
the public therefore enjoys "free access
to copy whatever the.., patent...
32
laws leave in the public domain."'
Perhaps the most extreme example of the patent bargain model in a
modem opinion is Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft
Corp.,133 which addressed a claim to trade dress protection in a portion of
an electric fan design covered at least to some extent by a utility patent.'34
Having concluded that the feature in question was nonfunctional and
distinctive, the district court had enjoined the sale of a directly competitive
fan sporting the same feature. 35 The Tenth Circuit reversed this outcome,
however, not because its review ofthe record disclosed that the feature was
in fact functional, but instead on the theory that the federal utility patent

129. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964) (holding that the

expiration of a utility patent dedicates to the public "the right to make (the patented device] in
precisely the shape it carried when patented"); see also Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S.
I 11, 119-22 (1938); Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562, 572-73 (1893).
130. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945); see also Inwood Labs.
v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 863 (1982) (White, J., concurring) ("[A]fter expiration ofapatent, [the
material disclosed by the patent] is no more the property of the originator than the product itself.").
13 1. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989).
132. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
133. 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995).
134. Id. at 1500.
135. Id. at 1500-01.
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statutes created a right to copy that trumped even the plaintiffs strident
claims of nonfunctionality:
[W]here a disputed product configuration is part of a claim in
a utility patent, and the configuration is a described,
significant inventive aspect of the invention so that without it
the invention could not fairly be said to be the same invention,
patent law prevents its protection as trade dress, even if the
configuration is nonfunctional."3 6
Under this analysis, the appearance of a feature in a patent's claims may
preclude trade dress claims to the feature, regardless of any showing of

protectability the plaintiff may make.
The other explanation-one that is not necessarily inconsistent with the
patent bargain model-is that the significance of a utility patent lies in what
it says about the underlying design, rather than in its mere existence.
Although the prerequisites for trade dress protection of use in commerce,
distinctiveness, and either likelihood of confusion or dilution obviously
distinguish the trade dress doctrine from its utility patent counterpart, 3 7 the

functionality doctrine in particular traditionally has been
regarded as
13
critical to maintaining the dividing line between the two:

The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which
seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm's

reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition
by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature.
136. Id. at 1510 (citation omitted).
137. As one court has explained, albeit in the design patent context, "[tihe trademark owner
has an indefinite term of protection, it is true, but in an infringement suit must also prove secondary
meaning and likelihood of confusion, which the owner of a design patent need not do; there is
therefore no necessary inconsistency between the two modes of protection." W.T. Rogers Co. v.
Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Jay Dratler, Jr., Trade Dress for Product
Configurations:Is There a Conflict With PatentPolicy?, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 427, 595 (1996) ("The
existing doctrines of distinctiveness and functionality, coupled with the ubiquitous multi-factor
standard of likelihood of confusion, should suffice to prevent conflict with patent policy."
(footnote omitted)).
138. See, e.g., W.T. Rogers Co., 778 F.2d at 337 ("[P]rovided that a defense of functionality
is recognized, there is no conflict with federal patent law."); see also Ashley Furniture Indus. v.
Sangiacomo, N.A., 187 F.3d 363, 376 (4th Cir. 1999) ("IThe trade dress rule that functional
aspects of a product, although patentable, are not protectable as trade dress directly eliminates any
conflict between patents for useful items and trade dress protection for product configuration[s].");
David W. Operbeck, An Economic Perspectiveon Product ConfigurationTrade Dress,24 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 327, 370 (2000) ("If it is truly necessary for a competitor to use a patented feature
to manufacture a competitive product, the unfair competition laws will not unjustifiably extend the
life of the patent, because the functionality doctrine will dictate that the feature pass into the public
domain.").
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It is the province of patent law, not trademark law, to
encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over
new product designs or functions for a limited time.., after
which competitors are free to use the innovation. If a
product's functional features could be used as trademarks,
however, a monopoly over such features could be obtained
without regard to whether they qualify as patents and could
139
be extended forever ....
It is, of course, easy to conclude that claims to the protection of
functional features are properly stated in the metes and bounds of utility
patents; more difficult, however, is the question of what weight utilitarian
claims in a related patent should be given in the trade dress functionality
inquiry. It has always been apparent that averments of utility bear some
relationship to the eligibility for trade dress protection of the underlying
device. For example, as early as 1923, the Seventh Circuit noted of the
problems associated with the trade dress protection of a design formerly
addressed by a related utility patent that:
[I]f the structure which the patentee makes pursuant to his
patent is an embodiment of the elements of the claims or a
claim therein, and contains no artistic or distinguishing marks,
but is strictly a utilitarian article, where simplicity of structure
and cheapened cost of production are inherent in the
combination and constitute its virtue, then the mere fact that
a Chinese copy is made does not impose on the maker [of the
copy] the burden of establishing
his good faith or the absence
140
of unfair trade methods.
Under this functionality model, it is a patent's description of the
utilitarian aspects of the underlying design that constitutes its probative
value in the inquiry into trade dress validity. 4 ' For courts adhering to this
model, "[tihe functionality doctrine ...eliminate[s] the possibility of
perpetual exclusive right[s] to the utilitarian features of a [patented] product

139. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995) (citation omitted).
140. William H. Keller, Inc. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 298 F. 52, 57 (7th Cir. 1923).
141. See, e.g., Best Lock Corp. v. Schlage Lock Co., 413 F.2d 1195, 1199 (C.C.P.A. 1969)
("[I]t is clear to us that the ...patent incontrovertably establishes primary functionality."); In re
Shenango Ceramics, Inc., 362 F.2d 287, 291 (C.C.P.A. 1966) ("[T]he expired utility patent is
adequate evidence that the ...configuration here sought to be registered is indeed functional.");
In re Lincoln Diagnostics, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1817, 1819 (T.T.A.B. 1994) ("[T]he
patents... highlight the functional advantages provided by applicant's device...."); see alsoNew
England Butt Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 756 F.2d 874, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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under trademark law." '42 This equation of functionality and utility means
that "[w]hen federal trademark rights have been sought for functional
subject matter disclosed in a utility patent..., the acquisition of such rights
will not be allowed in view of the overriding public policy of preventing
their monopolization, of preserving the public right to copy. 143 Thus, "the
existence of one or more utility patents which disclose the superior
utilitarian advantages of a design generally is adequate, and frequently is
conclusive or incontrovertible, evidence of the de jure functionality of
configuration.', 144 This is particularly true if the utility patent appears to
overlap completely the claimant's description of its alleged trade dress.
Under these circumstances, "[a] utility patent comprehending the
the
configuration in question is adequate evidence
45 to establish that
configuration is indeed functional in character."'
As a historical matter, either model of the significance of utility patents
to trade dress claims therefore placed a premium on trade dress claimants'
ability to distinguish past averments of utility. 46 For example, in Black &
Decker v. Hoover Service Center,147 a plaintiff asserting utility patent and
trade dress protection initially fell short on the latter theory after the district
court focused on another patent that, although not at issue in the case,
nevertheless bore upon the plaintiff s design.14 The district court concluded
sua sponte on the basis of its review of a particular feature disclosed in the
49
patent that the plaintiffs design was ineligible for trade dress protection,
but the Federal Circuit vacated this determination. 5 ' According to the
Federal Circuit, the district court improperly had examined a claim bearing
on an internalfeature of the plaintiffs hand-held vacuum to conclude that
the product's external configuration was ineligible for trade dress
protection.' 5 '

142. William Pudenz GmbH v. Littelfuse, Inc., 177 F.3d 1204, 1208 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
143. In re Honeywell, 497 F.2d 1344, 1348 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Best Lock Corp., 413 F.2d at 1199 (rejecting application to register product
features on ground that a utility patent "disclosing the primary functional significance of [a]
configuration" claimed a source indicator "incontovertably establishes primary functionality").
144. In re Pingel Enters., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811,1817 (T.T.A.B. 1998); accordInre BioMedicus Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1254, 1257 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
145. In re Telesco Brophey Ltd., 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 427, 428 (T.T.A.B. 1971).
146. See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1982);
Polaris Pool Sys., Inc. v. Letro Prods., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1513, 1519 (C.D. Cal. 1995); In re
Harvestall Indus., 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 973, 974-75 (T.T.A.B. 1985); In re Carr-Griff, Inc., 223
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 359, 361 (T.T.A.B. 1984).
147. 886 F.2d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
148. Id. at 1286.
149. Id. at 1290.
150. Id. at 1290-91.
151. Id.
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A similar conundrum faced the plaintiff in Dogloo, Inc. v. Doskocil
Manufacturing Co.,'52 which addressed the protectability of an iglooshaped pet shelter.'53 Although the defendant sought to defend against the
plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunctive relief by invoking a utility
patent covering the design,'54 the court was unconvinced of the design's
functionality. 5 Reviewing the patent, the court noted that the feature
sought to be protected was a mere "incidental detail," rather than being
expressly covered by the plaintiffs claims of utility.'5 6 As the court
explained, "[a] utility patent must.., be examined in detail to determine
whether the disclosed configuration is really primarily functional or just
57
incidentally appears in the disclosure of the patent."'
Other trade dress claimants have been considerably less successful in
distinguishing their prior utility patent claims. For example, Elmer v. ICC
Fabricating, Inc.' 58 presented an unlikely candidate for trade dress
protection, namely a vehicle-mounted advertising sign covered at least to
some degree by both a utility patent and a design patent. 159 When the
defendant introduced a competing model, the plaintiffs responded with a
suit in the Middle District of Florida that alleged infringement of each
patent, as well as trade dress infringement. 6 ' The initial outcome was a
complete victory for the plaintiffs, who convinced ajury to find liability on
each cause of action and to make a multimillion dollar award of damages.1 '
The district court declined to enter a JMOL, and the defendant appealed to
the Federal Circuit.'62
Applying Eleventh Circuit law, the Federal Circuit invoked the
plaintiffs utility patent to overturn the jury's findings under both a
functionality and a patent bargain analysis.' 63 As to the former, the court
noted that the claims of the utility patent rebutted any evidence that the

152. 893 F. Supp. 911 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
153. Id. at 914.
154. Id. at 915.
155. Id. at 919.
156. Id.
157. Id. For other cases employing similar methodology, see Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West
Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 256 n.20 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he mere fact that a feature is named in a
utility patent does not automatically render it functional. Many non-functional configurations are
incidentally included in utility patents."); In re Harvestall Indus., 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 973, 974
(T.T.A.B. 1985) ("The patent claims... relate to the grain-drying function of applicant's grain bins,
in general, rather than to the particular [configuration].").
158. 67 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
159. Id. at 1573.
160. Id.
161. Id.,
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1580.
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plaintiffs may have introduced in support of their claims
nonfunctionality.' 4 As to the latter, the court held:

of

[O]nce the... patent expires, the public will be entitled to
practice the invention claimed in the patent. Enforcing a
"trade dress" right defined, as it was here, to be essentially
coextensive with, and in fact broader than, claim 1 of
the... patent would frustrate that right because trade dress
protection may last indefinitely and thus competitors could
not effectively "copy and use" the invention after the patent
expires.... Here... enforcing such a trade dress would
effectively extend the life of the patent. 65
Having reached this conclusion, the Elmer court found the plaintiffs' design
functional as a matter of law after determining that there was no substantial
evidence supporting the verdict.' 66
It is thus apparent that the reading of a utility patent properly should
have at least some significance to the inquiry into whether the covered
design is eligible for trade dress protection. It is the nature of this exercise
that was at issue in TrafFix and that occupies the remainder of this Article.

V. TRAFFIX DEVICES; INC. . MARKETING DISPLAYS, INC.
TrafFix involved claims of trade dress protection to a line of springmounted stands for holding and displaying signs, one of several lines
marketed by the plaintiff.'67 The plaintiffs original product was "a
68
business-type wind-resistant sign..., such as those seen at gas stations,"'
which featured a rectangular display surface with one of its short sides
attached to a base by a pair of springs.'69 Following the introduction of two
variations of its product, the plaintiff sought and received two utility
patents bearing on its designs. 7 Each claim of each patent, however, on its
face relied upon "spaced-apart" torsion springs that connected the frame to
the base of the stand.' 7 ' As the abstract of one patent explained:

164. Id.
165. Id. (citation omitted).
166. Id.
167. See generallyMktg. Displays, Inc. v. TralFix Devices, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Mich.
1997), rev'd, 200 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 1255 (2001).
168. Id. at264.
169. Id.
170. See U.S. PatentNo. 3,662,482 (issued May 16,1972); U.S. Patent No. 3,646,696 (issued
March 7, 1972).
171. U.S. Patent No. 3,662,482 (issued May 16, 1972); U.S. Patent No. 3,646,699 (issued
March 7, 1972).
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[This] poster display device includes a base upon which is
mounted a poster frame. The means for mounting the poster
frame onto the base comprise a spring structure
interconnecting the lower portion of the poster frame to the
base. In one embodiment, the spring structure comprises a
pair of spaced-apart coil springs which extend between the
frame and the base.... The poster frame has a pair of
spaced-apart brackets on the
lower edge thereof which
72
springs.1
torsion
the
engage
According to the plaintiff, however, the rights under its patents were not
limited to devices employing widely spaced-apart springs. 171 On the
contrary, when a third party entered the marketplace with a line of signs
featuring a more closely-spaced pair of springs bearing a frame intended to
hold a square sign by one of its corners, the plaintiff sued, alleging both
literal infringement and infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 74
The district court rejected the plaintiff s claims of literal infringement on
the ground that "[t]here are sufficient minor differences between the patent
claims and the accused products to conclude that the defendants did not
directly infringe the [plaintiffs] patents.' 17 ' The plaintiff was more
successful in relying on the doctrine of equivalents, however, as the district
court concluded that "[t]he distance separating the springs is not a
significant factor" in removing the accused device from the patents'
ambit. 76 As a consequence, the defendant in the earlier case was held

172.
173.
671 (9th
174.
175.
176.

U.S. Patent No. 3,646,696 (issued March 7, 1972).
See Sarkisian v. Winn-ProofCorp., 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 60 (D. Or. 1978), aftd,686 F.2d
Cir. 1981).
Seeid. at66.
Id.
Id. In affirming the district court opinion on this point, the Ninth Circuit explained:
The district court ... found that the pair of springs used in the accused sign
stand was the equivalent of the pair of "spaced apart" coil springs described in the
claims of [the plaintiff's] '696 patent. The pair of springs in the.., patent served
two functions: they minimized canting or twisting of the display board around its
vertical axis, and they assured that the sign stand would be deflected away from
the line of traffic should the stand be struck by a vehicle. The evidence established
that the crucial determinant of the spring's effectiveness for these purposes is not
the horizontal distance between the springs, but is whether the springs are located
on the same vertical axis. So long as the springs are located on different vertical
axes, they will function effectively regardless of how close or how "spaced apart"
they are on the horizontal plane. The pair of springs on the accused device, located
on different vertical axes, function in... precisely the same manner. The district
court's finding of equivalence is therefore fully supported by the evidence and is
not clearly erroneous.
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subject to a permanent injunction barring it from further use of the designs,
an accounting of its profits, and an award of the plaintiffs damages.17 7
Perhaps emboldened by the plaintiff's at least partial success in
demonstrating that a closely-spaced spring configuration lay within the
scope of its now-expired patents, the defendant in TrafFix introduced a
competing line of traffic control signs that utilized that design.178 Not
willing to give up the exclusivity of use it had enjoyed during the pendency
of its patents, the plaintiff filed a trade dress infringement suit, alleging,
among other things, that its twin spring configuration was a nonfunctional
brand signal. Responding to the defendant's motion for summary judgment
on functionality grounds, the plaintiff argued among other things that the
patents were "irrelevant" to its trade dress claims.179
The district court, however, disagreed. Quoting Professor McCarthy, the
court began its analysis by observing that "'[tihe existence of a valid
functional patent disclosing the utilitarian advantages of the configuration
in question is very strong, if not conclusive, evidence of the functionality
1 80
of the configuration in which trademark significance is alleged.'
According to the court, this rule created an "effective presumption" of
functionality for the plaintiffs devices, which the plaintiff then bore the
burden of overcoming."'
In the face of the plaintiffs efforts to distinguish the language of its
utility patent claims, the court soon turned to extrinsic evidence, namely the
plaintiff's past enforcement efforts."' The court noted that in the prior
patent infringement suit the plaintiff s president (and actual owner of the
patent) successfully had challenged the manufacture and sale of the third
party's product that was "virtually identical" to that of the defendant. 83
Examining the allegations of the plaintiff s president in the earlier case, the
court found them inconsistent with the plaintiff s allegations that the same
patents in the case before it were sufficiently narrow in scope that they did
not threaten the plaintiffs latter-day trade dress claims.' 84 Although
ultimately entering summary judgment in the defendant's favor on
functionality grounds, the court did so not on the basis of a purely legal
construction ofthe patent claims at issue, but instead because "[tihe expired

Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 686 F.2d 671, 686 (9th Cir. 1981).
177. See Sark'sian,203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 68.
178. Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, 972 F. Supp. 262, 264 (E.D. Mich. 1997).

179. Id. at272.
180. Id. (quoting 1 J. THoMAs MCCARTHY, McCARTHY
COMPETITION § 7:89 (4th ed. 1996)).
181.
182.
183.
184.

ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR

Id.
Id. at273-74.
Id.
Id.
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utility patents are especially strong evidence of the usefulness of the...
design" and because the plaintiff "has not proffered sufficient evidence
which would enable a reasonable trier of fact to find that [its] ...design is
non-functional."' 85
The Sixth Circuit, however, vacated this determination.1 6 Reviewing
the district court's application of the patent bargain model, the appellate
court concluded that there was no necessary barrier to the trade dress
protection of a design addressed by the claims of a utility patent." 7 Rather,
not only was the functionality of the underlying design the proper inquiry,
the existence of a utility patent did not,88as the district court had concluded,
create a presumption of functionality.1
Having thus framed the relevant question, the Sixth Circuit then gave
the plaintiff's prior claims of utility little weight in determining that a
factual dispute precluded a finding of functionality as a matter of law. 9 In
substantial part, this holding resulted from the court's acceptance of the
plaintiff's argument that the defendant easily could have designed around
the relatively narrow category of material falling within the patent's
scope.' 90 It also resulted from the appellate court's view of the functionality
doctrine, on which the court observed, "[t]he appropriate question is
whether the particular product configuration is a competitive necessity."'l'
Because "numerous competitors" of the parties were using a myriad of
other products that did not feature a dual-spring design, the court reasoned,
use of the design could not be necessary for competition, a holding that
mooted the defendant's claims of utilitarian functionality. 9
Taking the case on a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed in
an opinion that wholly ignored the Court's past statements of the per se
patent bargain model and instead adopted the functionality model as the
appropriate standard.' 93 Noting that the owners of trade dresses not
registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office bore the burden of
demonstrating the nonfunctionality oftheir designs, 94 the Court concluded

185. Id. at 276.
186. See Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 1999), revd,
121 S. Ct. 1255 (2001).
187. Id. at 939.
188. Id. at 938-41.
189. Id. at 936.
190. Id. at 940.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. TrafFix, 121 S.Ct. at 1262.
194. See 15 U.S.C. § I 125(a)(3) (2000) ("In a civil action for trade dress infringement, not
registered on the principal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of
proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional.").
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that, rather than the contents of a utility patent serving as a contract that
placed the subject matter of the patent into the public domain:
A utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein
claimed are functional. If trade dress protection is sought
for those features the strong evidence of functionality based
on the previous patent adds great weight to the statutory
presumption that features are deemed functional until
proved otherwise by the party seeking trade dress
protection. Where the expired patent claimed the features in
question, one who seeks to establish trade dress protection
must carry the heavy burden of showing that the feature is
not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely an
ornamental, incidental or arbitrary aspect of the device. 5
According to the Court, the Sixth Circuit had erred by focusing on
whether the design in question was competitively necessary. 6 Although
acknowledging that some of its prior authority had suggested that
competitive necessity was an appropriate test for functionality,' the Court
denied that its past observations on the subject had been intended to serve
as a "comprehensive definition" offunctionality.'98 Rather, it now clarified,
competitive necessity was relevant only to the inquiry into whether the
trade dress in question was aesthetically functional.' 99 Where allegations of
utilitarian functionality were concerned, "a feature is ...functional when
it is essential to the use or purpose of the device or when it affects the cost
or quality of the device."2 °
Applying this rule to the facts before it-and without reference to the
standard of review it was applying-the Court focused exclusively on the
plaintiff s utility patents.20 ' The Court did not invoke the patents' claims,
however, but instead looked to their specifications. 2 2 Noting the
specifications' averments of utilitarian superiority over competitive
designs, the Court concluded that "[u]sing a dual-spring design rather than
a single spring achieves important operational advantages." 203 The Court
195. TrajFix,121 S.Ct. at 1260.
196. Id. at 1261.
197. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (characterizing
a functional feature as one the "exclusive use of [which] would put competitors at a significant nonreputation-related disadvantage").
198. TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1261.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Val. 54

buttressed this conclusion by referring to statements made by the plaintiff's
predecessor during the prosecution of his patent applications that the design
was cost-effective as well: "These statements made in the patent
applications and in the course of procuring the patents demonstrate the
functionality of the design., 20 4 Finally, the Court noted that the defendant's
characterization of the plaintiffs claims was supported by the plaintiffs
own position in its earlier litigation against the third party infringer.05
Significantly, the Court did allow for the possibility of a patentee
distinguishing its past averments:
In a case where a manufacturer seeks to protect arbitrary,
incidental, or ornamental aspects of features of a patent found
in the patent claims, such as arbitrary curves in the legs or an
ornamental pattern painted on the springs, a different result
might obtain. There the manufacturer could perhaps prove that
those aspects do not serve a purpose within the terms of the
utility patent. The inquiry into whether such features, asserted
to be trade dress, are functional by reason of their inclusion in
the claims of an expired utility patent could be aided by going
beyond the claims and examining the patent and its
prosecution history to see if the feature in question is shown
as a useful part of the invention. 0 6
As the Court concluded, "[n]o such claim is made here, however.

207

VI. THE DEATH KNELL OF THE PATENT BARGAIN MODEL?
On one level, the Supreme Court's decision in TrafFix produced an
entirely salutary result: the plaintiff lost. As far as trade dress goes, that
claimed by the TrafFix plaintiff was relatively pedestrian in nature, and
hardly the sort that actually would be relied upon as a brand signal in the
real world.20 8 Of equal importance, as the district court concluded, the
circumstances under which such a product was purchased did not

204. Id
205. See id. at 1260-61.
206. Id.at 1262.
207. Id.
208. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000) ("Consumers are
aware of the reality that, almost invariably, even the most unusual of product designs... is
intended not to identify the source, but to render the product itself more useful or more
appealing."); EFS Mktg., Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 76 F.3d 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[C]onsumers
do not associate the design of a product with a particular manufacturer as readily as they do a
trademark or a product-packaging trade dress."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 16 cmt. b (1995) ("As a practical matter,... it is less common for consumers to
recognize the design of a product or product feature as an indication of source.").
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necessarily lend themselves to confusion at the point of sale.2"9 One
explanation for the opinion may therefore lie in the Court's having seen one
too many strained trade dress suits circulating in the lower courts.
Nevertheless, the significance ofthe Court's opinion obviously extends
beyond the facts of the case before it. Coming from a tribunal known for its
preference for its own authority, the opinion is remarkably devoid of any
citations to, much less reliance on, the Court's numerous past invocations
of the per se patent bargain model.210 The absence of any such citations is
understandable, however, for the opinion represents a rare example of the
Court abandoning its own doctrine for that of the lower federal courts. The
Court's failure to explain its sudden acceptance of the functionality model
at the expense of the patent bargain paradigm it had articulated over the
previous century should not, however, obscure the existence of compelling
reasons for doing so.
In particular, and contrary to the Court's prior understanding of the
prerequisites for trade dress protection, a trade dress infringement plaintiff
does not enter the courtroom armed with a utility patent, which it then
asserts is valid and infringed either literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents. Rather, that claimant must demonstrate (1) actual use in
commerce, (2) of a distinctive indicator of source, (3) that is nonfunctional,
and (4) use by the defendant of a confusingly similar device. 21' Because
none of these showings bears any relationship whatsoever to the
prerequisites for utility patent protection, the proposition that an extension
of trade dress protection somehow can "extend" the protection previously
afforded by a related utility patent is a non sequitur.2 As one commentator

209. See Mktg. Displays, Inc. v.TrafFix Devices, 971 F. Supp. 262,270-72 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
210. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964); Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg.
Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1945); Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119 (1938);
Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896); see also Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs.,
456 U.S. 844, 863 (1982) (White, J., concurring in result) ("[Alfter expiration of a patent, [the
material disclosed by the patent] is no more the property of the originator than the product itself.").
211. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
212. To be sure, the Court was not alone in its historical tendency to view trade dress and
utility patent law as equivalents by overlooking the actual (and differing) prerequisites for relief
under each regime. See, e.g., Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
("Here, . . . the 'trade dress' was broadly defined to be essentially coextensive with, and in fact
broader than, the patent claim, and enforcing such a trade dress would effectively extend the life
of the patent."); Merchant & Evans v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 633-34 (3d Cir.
1992) ("To allow indefinite trademark protection of product innovations would frustrate the
purpose of the limited duration of patents to foster competition by allowing innovations to enter the
public domain after seventeen years."); Lon Tai Shing Co. v. Koch + Lowy, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1081, 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("If a product is not patentable or if its patent has expired, the policy
of promoting free competition embodied in the patent laws suggests that the product should not be
entitled to protection from competitors and certainly should not receive protection in perpetuity,
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has explained in the functionality context, "if competitors do not need
access to a feature in order to compete, allowing the patentee to exert
exclusive rights in that feature from now until Judgment Day will not
will instead bestow some limited
confer any monopoly power and
21
3
benefits on consumers.
Simply put, nonfunctional and distinctive elements added to a particular
good, like a verbal trademark attached to it, are not monopolies in the
underlying utilitarian good.214 On the contrary, they are brand signals, and
no market has ever been defined as narrowly as a single brand. 215 There is
no readily apparent reason why the Court's observation in Two Pesos,Inc.
v. Taco Cabana,Inc. 216 that "[p]rotection of trade dress, no less than of
trademarks, serves the [Lanham] Act's purpose to secure to the owner of
the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of
consumers to distinguish among competing producers ' " 7 should not apply
with equal force to the facts underlying TrafFix.
There are additional doctrinal problems associated with the patent
bargain model that warrant its dismissal, even if those problems went
unacknowledged by the Court. The theory that the contents of such a patent
which may be the effect of the invocation of trademark law."); see also Kevin E. Mohr, At the
Interface of Patent and TrademarkLaw: Should a Product ConfigurationDisclosed in a Utility
PatentEver Qualifyfor TradeDress Protection?,19 HASTINGS COMM. &ENT. L.J. 339,429 (1997)
("To allow... trade dress [disclosed by a related utility patent] to stand would potentially extend
the constitutionally-mandated limited-duration patent term."); Glen A. Weitzer, Note, No Trade
Dress Protectionfor Anything Disclosedin a Patent: A Defense of the Supreme Court's Per Se
Restriction, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 181, 196 (2000) ("Any attempt 'whatever the legal
device employed,' including federal trademark law, to reserve 'any particular descriptive matter
appearing in the specifications, drawings or claims' after the patent expires conflicts with the laws
and policies of patent law." (quoting Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg., Inc., 326 U.S. 249,255-56
(1945)); Gwendolyn Gill, Comment, Through the Back Door: Attempts to Use Trade Dress to
Protect Expired Patents, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 1269, 1296 (1999) ("[U]pon the expiration of a valid
patent ... , a patent holder may then use the all-encompassing trade dress [doctrine] to extend
protection and prohibit copying of any part of the patented invention. Thus, a virtual patent with
unlimited duration is created.").
213. Thomas F. Cotter, Is This Conflict ReallyNecessary?: Resolving an Ostensible Conflict
Between Patent Law and Federal Trademark Law, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 25, 62-63
(1999).
214. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 821 n.5 (9th Cir. 1980).
215. See United States v. E.I. Du Pont deNemours &Co., 351 U.S. 377,393 (1956). "Product
markets are not defined in terms of one trademark or another; trademarks simply identify the origin
of a product. [It cannot be argued] that Amoco gasoline, Mobil gasoline, and Shell gasoline are
three separate product markets." Generac Corp. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 172 F.3d 971, 977 (7th Cir.
1999); see also Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Significantly, while
a patent creates a type of monopoly pricing power by giving the patentee the exclusive right to
make and sell the innovation, a [product configuration] trademark gives the owner only the right
to preclude others from using the mark when such use is likely to cause confusion or to deceive.').
216. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
217. Id. at 774 (quoting Park'n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985)).
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can dispositively preclude trade dress protection may be grounded in one
of two theories. The first is that the plaintiffs own product is ineligible for
protection because it is reflected in the four comers of the patent. The
second is that the defendant's sale of its product is somehow privileged
because the product falls within the patent's scope. The Court's earlier
patent bargain opinions, of course, focused on the former theory.2 1 And,
under either the patent bargain or the functionality models, a utility patent
remains a quintessential written document even in the trade dress context.
As a result, the Court's previous willingness to articulate a per se rule
against protection for designs disclosed by related utility patents is at least
to some degree understandable.
Indeed, to reiterate, even apart from the Court's own opinions, it is also
true that prior to TrafFix there was ample precedent interpreting the
disclosure of related utility patents as a matter of law. For example, in
Elmer v. ICC Fabricating,Inc.,29 the Federal Circuit reversed a district
court finding of nonfunctionality after concluding that the claims of the
plaintiff s utility patent were "essentially coextensive" with the plaintiff's
trade dress claims. Likewise, in Best Lock Corp. v. Schlage Lock Co.,"'
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed entry of summary
judgment in an opposer's favor on the ground that "it is clear to us that the
'
[applicant's] patent incontrovertibly establishes primary functionality."222
The reverse result, namely a determination based only on a utility
patent's text that its disclosure is irrelevant as matter of law to trade dress
claims brought by a patentee, obviously also was possible. For example, in
Zip Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp.,223 the plaintiff sought trade dress protection
for "the 'overall configuration of a slatted cover for an awning on a
recreation vehicle,"' 224 which the defendant claimed was wholly
encompassed by an expired utility patent. Unlike most claims implicated
in trade dress litigation, however, that in question in Zip Dee was a
dependent, rather than independent,one, and the court held this distinction
sufficient as a matter of law to prevent the patent from disqualifying the
configuration from trade dress protection:
[W]here as here the product configuration is not imbedded
within the principal claim of the patent, being found instead
only in a dependent claim or claims, [it may not be
218.
Co., 163
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See Kellog Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg.
U.S. 169 (1896).
67 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1580.
413 F.2d 1195 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
Id. at 1199.
931 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. I11.1996).
Id. at 605.
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dispositive]. After all, such secondary placement means that
even during the life of the patent the entire world is able to use
the product configuration in every way except in linkage with
the subject matter of the principal claim....
...

Hence closing a product configuation as a dependent claim

says nothing per se ... .225
There are, however, several notable problems associated with the per se
patent bargain model, the most significant of which lies in the differing
ways of determining the proper scope of utility patent and trade dress
rights. In the utility patent context, the plaintiff's rights are determined by
the claims of the patent.116 "The claims alone delimit the right to exclude;
' Thus, "to decide what the claims mean is
only they may be infringed."227
nearly always to decide the case."22 Whether the product the patentee
actually puts onto the market corresponds to the one disclosed by the patent
therefore is ordinarily irrelevant to the inquiry into the scope of the
patent. 229 Indeed, the plaintiff need not have a product on the market at all
to be able to exclude competitors from the use of designs that either
literally infringe the patent or do so under the doctrine of equivalents."
In contrast, trademark and trade dress rights are not dependent on the
four comers of a document issued by the Patent and Trademark Office, but
instead arise from the use of the claimed designation in commerce. 23' "The

225. Id. at 615-16.
226. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339 (1961)
(holding that claims are the sole measure of the extent of the patentee's rights).
227. Envtl. Instruments, Inc. v. Sutron Corp., 877 F.2d 1561, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1989); accord
SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc).
228. Markman I, 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J., concurring).
229. See, e.g., Uniroyal Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
("This court has repeatedly held that it is the claims which define the invention.").
230. As the Supreme Court has explained:
A patent owner is not in the position of a quasi-trustee for the public or under
any obligation to see that the public acquires the free right to use the invention.
He has no obligation either to use it or to grant its use to others. If he discloses the
invention in his application so that it will come into the public domain at the end
of the [statutory] period of exclusive right he has fulfilled the only obligation
imposed by the statute.
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432 (1945).
231. See Michael H. Davis, Death of a Salesman's Doctrine:A CriticalLook at Trademark
Use, 19 GA. L. REV. 233, 241 n. 19 (1985) ("Trademark rights exist only as long as the mark is used,
although there is no fixed limit on protection so that, theoretically, they could be perpetual.... [In
contrast, t]here is no requirement that the patentee use or work the patent to maintain the patent
rights.").
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owner of a trade-mark may not, like the proprietor of a patented invention,

make a negative and merely prohibitive use of it as a monopoly." 2 2 As a
consequence, a registration issued by the Patent and Trademark Office has
marginal value if the underlying mark or trade dress differs from the one
actually used in the marketplace. Thus, for example, if the trade dress is no
longer in use, the registration covering it is subject to cancellation.233
Likewise, the procedural and substantive advantages attaching to federal
registrations"' are available only to the particular versions of the marks and
trade dresses depicted in them, rather than differing variations that might
actually appear in the marketplace." 5
The result is that there may be a disconnect between the appearance of
a claimed trade dress as it is reflected in the marketplace, on the one hand,
and in the disclosure of a related utility patent, on the other:

A manufacturer may choose in its commercial embodiment
of a patented device to less than faithfully replicate the
exemplary depiction ofa claimed embodiment shown in the
figures of the patent. Hence, for purposes of evaluating the
existence or impact of product copying, the relevance of
patent figures depends on the extent to which their

232. Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257, 261 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (quoting United
Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1918)).
233. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2000).
234. Prior to its fifth anniversary, a registration constitutes "prima facie" of the underlying
mark's validity. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) ("Any registration... owned by a party to an action shall be
admissible in evidence and shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark...
in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the registration.. . ."); see
also id. § 1057(b) ("A certificate of registration of a mark upon the principal register provided by
this [Act] shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration
of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark, and ofthe registrant's exclusive right to use
the registered mark in commerce ....
"). Although this prima facie evidence may be rebutted, see,
e.g., Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 869 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam), the
registration can become "incontestable" once it has passed its fifth anniversary and provided that
the registrant complies with certain statutory formalities. 15 U.S.C. § 1065; 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.167.168 (2001). At this point, the registration constitutes "conclusive" evidence of the validity of the
underlying designation of origin, subject only to the narrowly drawn defenses set forth in section
33(b) of the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(1)-(9).
235. See, e.g., Igloo Prods. Corp. v. Brantex, Inc., 202 F.3d 814, 817 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[The]
primafacie presumption [of validity] pertains to the whole mark... rather than to any individual
portion ofthe mark."); Paco Sport Ltd. v. Paco Rabane Parfums, 86 F. Supp. 2d 305, 312 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) ("[IThe presumption of distinctiveness applies only to the [registered] trademark as a whole,
and does not extend to its components."), aff'd, 234 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 2000) (unpublished
opinion); Walker v. Klein, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1649, 1652 (S.D. Cal. 1998) ("'The presumption
of validity is limited to the exact format of the mark as registered."') (quoting 4 J.THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:137 (4th ed. 1997)).
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appearance is replicated in the actual marketplace product
of the patentee.236
Applications of the patent bargain model traditionally have failed to
recognize that the design disclosed by a utility patent may not be the same
design to which the patentee actually claims trade dress rights. Indeed, a
stark example of this phenomenon is apparent in the underlying facts of
TrafFix itself. Properly construed as a matter of law, the plaintiff s defunct
utility patents memorialized a definite bundle of rights to a discrete device
or, at most, to a pair of devices, each of which was a "business-type windresistant sign stand that was used to display advertisements, such as those
seen at gas stations."2"' To reiterate, however, the defendant actually had
emulated a separate line of "traffic warning" stands mounted on dual
springs placed much closer together than the ones reflected in the plaintiff s
utility patents.23 Even as to its line of "business-type" products, the
plaintiff s actual inventory at the time of the decision reflected a range of
signs that varied in dimensions, frame appearance, color, and base
configuration, and additionally, differed from the drawings set forth in its
patents.' 39 That the plaintiff previously had established under the doctrine
of equivalents that its patents "covered" a third party's "traffic warning"
signs rendered the case an "easy" one: in the absence of this unusual set of
facts, the argument that the expiration of each of the plaintiffs patents
dedicated the underlying design to the public would have necessitated an
examination of the relationship between the patents' claims and the
product(s) actually marketed by the plaintiff, as well as the proper
methodology
for determining the degree of correspondence between the
0
two.

24

The patent bargain model is suspect for an additional reason. Although
the significance of a utility patent obviously is greatest in cases in which
the trade dress claimant itself has drafted the patent,2 -4' third-party patent

236. Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
overruledon othergrounds by Midwest Indus. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (en banc).
237. See Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 262, 264 (E.D. Mich.
1997).
238. See id. at 264, 273.
239. For representative examples of the plaintiff's advertising featuring these variations, see
http:/www.mdiworldwide.thomasregister.com/olc/mdiworldwidelocurb.htm (last visited Feb. 10,
2002).
240. See Mktg.Displays, 971 F. Supp. at 273-74.
241. See, e.g., In re Caterpillar Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1335, 1339 (T.T.A.B. 1997) ("It
is important to remember here that the utility patent was applied for and registered by the same
entity which now asserts trademark significance in the same configuration design."); see also In
re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 871-72 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss2/2

36

Davis: Directing TrafFix: A Comment on the Construction and Application
U77LITY PATENT CLAIMS IN TRADE DRESS LITIGATION

claims may also have an effect on the inquiry.24 2 As the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board has explained in rejecting an applicant's challenge to the
introduction of third-party utility patents:
Contrary to applicant's arguments, the fact that the
applicant is not the owner of the utility patents submitted by
the Examining Attorney is not a proper basis for their
exclusion as evidence in this appeal. These documents were
not submitted to show that applicant has made statements in
a patent application with regard to the functional advantages
of her product which are inconsistent with statements made in
her trademark application. Instead, the patents were submitted
to show that the features of the design configuration applicant
seeks to register as a trademark provide functional advantages.
The key is not who owns these patents, but rather what they
disclose.243
Indeed, a single third party utility patent in and of itself may be sufficient
evidence to make a prima facie showing of trade dress invalidity.244 By
failing to offer an explanation of why a trade dress claimant should be
prejudiced by the existence of a prior "bargain" to which it is not a party,
the patent bargain model does not adequately explain this phenomenon.
The TrafFix Court, of course, did not address any of these issues, nor
did it offer an explanation for the Court's abrupt departure from its own
past jurisprudence. Nevertheless, this failure should not obscure the
existence of reasons why the patent bargain model is, and always has been,
a simplistic and inadequate framework for resolving trade dress disputes
involving related utility patents. It is one thing to suggest that the expiration
of a utility patent places the subject matter of its claims into the public
domain; the mechanics of this placement, however, are more complicated
than the patent bargain model contemplates. It is for this reason that the
following section proposes an alternative model, one grounded firmly in the
black letter rules governing the construction and application of the content
of utility patents.

242. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire& RubberCo. v. Interco Tire Corp., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705,
1715-16 (T.T.A.B. 1998); In re American Nat'I Can Co., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841, 1844-45
(T.T.A.B. 1997) (examining third party patents and concluding that applicant's design was dejure
functional due to the absence of alternative designs).
243. In re Virshup, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1403, 1405 (T.T.A.B. 1997).
244. See, e.g., In re Hollaender Mfg. Co., 511 F.2d 1186, 1188 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
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VII. THE POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MARKMANTO
TRADE DRESS LITIGATION

If it properly abandoned its past adherence to the patent bargain rule, the
TrafFix Court nevertheless did little to provide lower courts hearing trade
dress cases with guidance on how. properly to interpret and apply the
disclosure of related utility patents. Consistent with that failure, the Court,
although purporting to reconcile utility patent law principles with federal
trade dress law, failed to refer to well-established principles governing the
construction and application of the utility patents at issue. Indeed, this
failure extended even to the Court's own precedent on the subject, namely
its opinion in Markman II.
To be sure, the Court is not alone in its apparent decision not to give
Markman II full effect in the trade dress context. For example, in the only
appellate opinion to date to address at length Markman Ifs significance to
trade dress law, Samara Bros. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.," the appellant
improbably sought to rely upon Markman II to overturn jury findings of
inherent distinctiveness and likely confusion, but not nonfunctionality. The
Second Circuit, however, was not sympathetic to the appellant's claim that
Markman HI was characteristic of a "trend" towards removing intellectual
property cases from juries:
We find no such "trend" reflected in the case law nor do
we find any law to support enforcement of a more rigorous
review of a jury verdict in a trade dress case. The [Supreme]
Court in Markman held only that judges, not juries, are
charged with construction of a patent, that is, deciding what
the "words in the [utility patent] claim mean." The Court
specifically noted, however, that "there is no dispute that
infringement cases today must be tried to a jury, as their
predecessors were more than two centuries ago." There is no
language in Markman which would extend its holding to nonpatent cases. As there is no written document to construe in a
trade dress controversy, we see no reason to read Markman as
impacting the jury's role in those cases.246
This holding is undoubtedly correct to the extent that the issues before
the court on appeal, distinctiveness and likelihood of confusion,
traditionally have been regarded in mostjurisdictions as questions of fact.247

245. 165 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1998), rev'd, 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
246. Id. at 124 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
247. The clear majority rule is to treat likelihood of confusion as a purely factual inquiry. See,
e.g., Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189,193 (3d Cir. 1995); Smith Fiberglass Prods. v.
Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1329 (7th Cir. 1993); Pacific Telesis Group v. Int'l Telesis
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In contrast to the precedent relied upon by the Markman courts, 2 4 8
therefore, there is no historical basis for removing these determinations
from juries as a matter of course. Likewise, because of the nature of the
trade dress at issue-the appearance of a line of clothing-there were no
utility patent claims warranting construction and application. Even after,
indeed, especially after the Court's opinion in TrafFix,the questionremains
open whether Markman II has any significance to a trade dress case in
which the proper scope of a related utility patent is in fact at issue.
This part addresses that issue and argues that the rules governing the
treatment of the disclosure of a related utility patent in the patent
infringement context cannot be ignored when that disclosure is injected into
trade dress litigation. Specifically, this part argues that (1) utility patent
claims can, and must, be constructed as a matter of law in connection with
their submission to a finder of fact in trade dress cases and (2) the
determination of the significance ofthe disclosure of a related utility patent
to the trade dress validity of a related design is necessarily a factual inquiry.
Each of these propositions is addressed below.
A. Claim Construction in the Trade Dress Context
Notwithstanding its willingness to wade into the meaning of the
contents of the plaintiff's patents, the TrafFix Court did not attempt to

Communications, 994 F.2d 1364, 1367(9th Cir. 1993); ConAgra, Inc. v. George A. Hormel & Co.,
990 F.2d 368,370-71 (8th Cir. 1993); Dieter v. B & H Indus., 880 F.2d 322,325 (1 lth Cir. 1989);
Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214,217 (5th Cir. 1985); J.M. Huber Corp.
v. Lowery Wellheads, Inc., 778 F.2d 1467, 1470 (10th Cir. 1985); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple,
747 F.2d 1522, 1526-27 (4th Cir. 1984); DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., 520 F.2d 499, 509
(Ist Cir. 1975). Although the Second and Sixth Circuits have at times treated the likelihood of
confusion as a legal issue, each nevertheless defers to factual findings underpinning the inquiry.
See Nikon, Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1993); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable
Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 1983). The Federal Circuit tends to regard the issue as a
purely legal one. See Weiss Assocs. v. HRL Assocs., 902 F.2d 1546, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
There is no comparable split in authority on the rule characterizing inquiries into distinctiveness
as factual ones. See, e.g., RFE Indus. v. SPM Corp., 105 F.3d 923, 924 (4th Cir. 1997) (reversing
finding of descriptiveness as clearly erroneous); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc.,
973 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[Ihe initial classification of a mark to determine its
eligibility for protection is a question of fact left to the determination of the district court."); Ford
Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 292 n.18 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The
characterization of a mark is a factual issue for the jury."); In re Bed & Breakfast Registry, 791
F.2d 157, 160 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ('Whether a mark is merely descriptive is a question of fact .... ");
WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d 1320, 1326 (8th Cir. 1984) ("The correct categorization of a given
term [on the spectrum of distinctiveness] is ... a factual issue."); see also Mil-Mar Shoe Co. v.
Shonac Corp., 75 F.3d 1153, 1157 (7th Cir. 1996); Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178,
1183 n.12 (5th Cir. 1980).
248. See Marknan II, 517 U.S. 370, 376-82 (1996); MarkmanI, 52 F.3d 967, 977 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
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provide lower courts with guidance on how to undertake such an operation.
Even more curious in light of the Court's determination to invalidate the
trade dress at issue was its failure to invoke the primary holding in
Markman II, namely that claim construction is a legal process presumably
undertaken by appellate, as well as trial courts. For, coupled with the
Federal Circuit's opinion in MarkmanI, an application of this aspect of the
Markman methodology would have provided the Court with a more logical
basis for its holding than that actually adopted by the Court. Specifically,
it is the treatment of extrinsic evidence outlined by the Federal Circuit that
holds the key to preventing claimants from shopping among intellectual
property regimes targeted by the Court in TrajTix.
In particular, it is apparent that Markmanh at a minimum shouldpermit
courts hearing trade dress cases involving related utility patent claims to
address at least on some level the claims' significance as a matter of pure
law, without the need for extrinsic evidence and testimony. More difficult
to resolve, however, are two related issues that necessarily follow from the
legal nature of claim construction. First, does MarkmanI!require courts to
withdraw the construction of the claims of utility patents from juries
hearing trade dress cases involving related designs? And second, do
Markman Is restrictions on the treatment of extrinsic evidence have any
applicability in the trade dress context?
The answer to the first question is clearly yes. It is a remarkable
phenomenon that courts hearing trade dress cases have been virtually
uniform in their failure to construct the meaning of the contents of utility
patents, whether before allowing the submission of the patents to a jury or
as part of their own evaluation of the claims' significance. Yet, the contents
of a utility patent obviously do not change when they are invoked in a trade
dress case, nor do they cease to be contained in the legal document that is
the patent. Moreover, if as both Markman land MarkmanHheld, juries are
ill-equipped to read utility patents without guidance from the court as to the
meaning of particular items, there is no apparent reason why they might
become sufficiently enlightened to tackle the job when convened to hear a
trade dress case involving the same patent.
The answer to the second question is clearly yes as well. To understand
why, it is necessary to examine the two types of recitations contained in a
utility patent that are most likely to play a role in inquiries into the validity
of trade dress claims to a design addressed by the patent. The first, and
most obvious are recitations of utility aimed at satisfying the requirements
of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Although utility and functionality may not be entirely
fungible concepts, it was apparent even before TrafFix not only that the
utility of a claimed device played a critical role in the functionality inquiry,
but also that claims in a patent might be particularly probative of that
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utility.249 Specifically, "[it is the utilitarian design of a utilitarian object
which must be examined in order to determine the question of its
'
Indeed, "[m]any [courts] follow the
[eligibility for protection]."25
utilitarian view of functionality: particular elements of overall trade dress
are functional if they are essential to the product's purpose or use or if they
affect the cost or the quality of the product."2' ' Trade dress claimants
therefore inevitably have fared better in the functionality inquiry when they
have been able to demonstrate that their designs actually impair the utility
of their products. 2
Second, a patentee may very well have included recitations bearing on
the trade dress functionality inquiry in an attempt to demonstrate that its
design is nonobvious. In particular, a determination of the degree of
nonobviousness reflected in a design requires consideration of several
factors, including (1) the scope and content of prior art, (2) differences
between the prior art and the claim at issue, (3) the level of ordinary skill
in the pertinent art, and, most importantly, (4) circumstances such as
commercial success, long felt but unresolved needs, and failure ofothers. 253
Thus, it is to satisfy the nonobviousness, rather than the utility, prerequisite
for patentability that applicants include such statements as that appearing
in one of the utility patents at issue in TrafFix:
One of the problems which has been encountered in the past
with . . . poster display devices is that they are frequently
tipped over by the wind.
The present invention overcomes this problem by
providing a poster frame which is mounted to a base by a
spring structure which permits the poster frame to be deflected
downwardly rather than upwardly whereby the component of
the wind force tending to tip the device is diminished as the
wind velocity increases. Also, the dimensions and location of
centers of gravity of the sign components are so dimensioned
as to prevent tipping of the sign after deflection of the frame
by the wind.254

249. See, e.g., In re Edward Ski Prods., Inc., 49 U.SP.Q.2d (BNA) 2001, 2003 (T.T.A.B.
1999) ("It is these utilitarian advantages set forth in the patent which we look to as evidence of de

jure functionality.").
250. In re North Am. Phillips Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 926, 927 (T.T.A.B. 1983).
251. Merchant & Evans v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1992)
(quoting I JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 702[7], at 7-76-81 (1991)).
252. See, e.g., Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. FruehaufCorp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1218 (8th Cir. 1976)
(upholding finding nonfunctionality in part on assessment of defendant's engineers that plaintiff's
configuration was "useless" and "gather[ed] road dirt and mud").
253. Graham v. John Deere & Co., 383 US. 1, 17-18 (1966).
254. U.S. Patent No. 3,662,482 (issued May 16, 1972).
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Even under TrafFix, commercial advantage of this sort is hardly a wholly
foreign consideration to the functionality inquiry, but instead can play a
significant role within it. 5 Indeed, even if a design is not functional in the
utilitarian sense, it nevertheless
may be found functional under the
256
competitive necessity test.
Should then, a patentee be able to distinguish its past averments of this
sort once it becomes necessary to limit the patent's scope for trade dress
purposes? Markman I holds that a patentee may not alter or contradict the
meaning of statements made during the patent application process through
evidence and testimony extrinsic to the patent, particularly if such an
alteration or contradiction would expand the patentee's rights under the
patent. 7 In the patent context, averments of utility and of commercial
advantage to establish nonobviousness are expansions of the patent's scope;
it is only in the trade dress context that they become limitations on the
patentee's claims to protection. Yet, limitations they are, and if they are
properly read in conjunction with the patent's claims, there is no apparent
reason under Markman H why the patentee should be permitted to
contradict its prior averments of utility and advantage in an attempt to
establish a protectable trade dress. Claim construction is claim construction,
whatever the context in which it may occur.
Indeed, an adoption in the trade dress context of Markman Ps
prohibition on the use of extrinsic evidence to contradict or otherwise alter
the claims of utility patents would hardly be a radical move. Even under
applications of the functionality model, plaintiffs generally never have had
carte blanche to distinguish their prior averments in patent applications. As
Professor McCarthy has summarized the case law, "[a] kind of estoppel
arises. That is, one cannot argue that a shape is functionally advantageous
in order to obtain a utility patent and later assert that the same shape is nonfunctional in order to obtain trademark protection.""
It is in accordance with this principle that some courts have, as a matter
of law, declined to allow trade dress claimants to distinguish past
averments in their utility patents. For example, in Disc Golf Ass'n v.
Champion Discs Inc.,259 the plaintiff was a manufacturer of targets used on
flying disc golf courses. 260 These targets featured a parabolic chain
configuration that captured flying discs striking it directly and then

255. See TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Displays Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1255, 1262 (2001).
256. See id.
257. See supra notes 54-58, 64-72 and accompanying text.
258. 1 J. THoMAs MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 7:89.1 (4th ed. 2001).
259. 158 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1998).
260. Id.
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deposited them into a basket. 261 Until 1994, the plaintiffs design was
covered by a utility patent, upon the expiration of which the defendant
introduced a closely similar competitive product.262
When the plaintiffbrought a trade dress infringement suit, the defendant
predictably moved for summary judgment on functionality grounds.26 3
Confronted with the claims in its utility patent, the plaintiff sought to create
ajusticiable factual dispute by explaining away its prior averments through
the declaration testimony of its president.264 Both the district court and the
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, with the appellate court noting that:
A party cannot create a triable issue of fact, and thus survive
summary judgment, merely by contradicting his or her own
sworn deposition testimony with a later declaration. That is, in
effect, what [the plaintiff] is trying to do. Its president made,
under oath, certain claims with respect to the utilitarian
advantages of the . . . design when he applied for patent
protection. [The plaintiff] cannot create a triable issue of fact
so as to survive summary judgment by contradicting those
sworn claims after the patent has expired.265
Although articulated without reference to utility patent law principles,
this holding is entirely consistent with them. If, as Markman I concluded,
a patentee may not rely on extrinsic evidence and testimony to contradict
the express terms of the patent, there is no apparent reason why this rule
should not apply with equal force in the trade dress context. Just as
extrinsic evidence and testimony properly may not be used to expand utility
patent claims, so too should they not be used to restrict the same claims
once the inquiry has become one of trade dress validity. In the absence of

261. As the specifications to the patent explained:
A problem has arisen in the prior art flying disc golf courses in detecting as a
certainty whether or not a disc has actually struck the post for any particular
throw, especially when the disc has been thrown in the direction of the post from
a considerable distance.
The aforesaid problem is solved by the device of the present invention, which
provides an energy absorbing means on the post which serves to arrest the forward
motion of the disc, and which also provides an entrapment means in which the
disc is deposited. By use of the device of the present invention, any disc properly
thrown against the post is caught, and all prior ambiguities are obviated.
U.S. Patent No. 4,039,189 (issued Aug. 2, 1977).
262. Disc GolfAss'n, 158 F.3d at 1004-05.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1008.
265. Id. (footnote omitted).
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such a rule, although a patentee would be unable to expand upon her claims
in an inquiry into the scope of the protection afforded by the patent itself,
those claims might well be restricted for purposes of establishing the
covered design's eligibility for trade dress protection using the same
techniques prohibited by Markman L The result would be a divergent
treatment of the same issue (albeit in mirror image form) by the respective
utility patent and trade dress regimes.
In any case, even if the process requires the use of"clarifying" extrinsic
evidence, a determination of the meaning of a patent's claims in a trade
dress dispute is claim construction, pure and simple. And if claim
construction is an exercise in legal analysis, there is little reason for courts
faced with allegations of trade dress protection to a design addressed by the
disclosure of a related utility patent not to clarify the scope of the patent's
claims as a matter of law, even if the resulting construction mandates
dismissal of the patentee's allegations ofprotectable trade dress. This is not
to suggest, of course, that the potential availability of utility patent
protection necessarily renders a design ineligible for trade dress protection
or that the mere existence of a utility patent should in and of itself trump
trade dress claims under either the functionality or the patent bargain
models. Indeed, an early Markman-style inquiry into the nature of a
patentee's claims may very well determine that the claims of the patent are
irrelevant to the inquiry into the validity of the trade dress in question and
therefore need not be presented to the jury at all.
B. The Significance of the Disclosure of a Related Utility Patent to the
Functionalityof the Plaintiff'sClaimed Trade Dress
Perhaps out of force of habit arising from decades of adherence to the
patent bargain model, the TrafFix Court's opinion initially signaled a
reliance on the claims set forth in the plaintiffs utility patents. 266 The
Court's ultimate treatment of the claims' content, however, was limited to
the proposition that "the disclosure of a feature in the claims of a utility
patent constitutes strong evidence of functionality ....
267 If, as this Article
has suggested, the TrafFix Court's departure from its past strict adherence
to the patent bargain model was well advised, the Court's treatment of the
evidentiary value of the plaintiff's patents was equally proper, albeit once
again for reasons not articulated by the Court.
For example, the Court's focus on the specifications and file wrapper
histories of the plaintiffs patents in support of its determination of
functionality was appropriate, and not only because of the role that these
categories of intrinsic evidence play in determining the scope of utility

266. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1255, 1260 (2001).
267. Id.
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patents.268 Rather, the historical focus of trade dress doctrine has been on
the overall disclosure ofthe patent, which may include the specification, as
well as the claims.269 Consequently, the Patent and Trademark Office has
rejected claims of trade dress protection based on the recitations of utility
and competitive advantage contained in the "background to the invention"
sections of related utility patents.27 The preferred embodiment of an
invention recited in a patent is also evidence of its functionality for trade
dress purposes.2 71 Even the drawings set forth in a utility patent may be
taken into account as part of the disclosure of the patent when determining
whether the design underlying the patent is impermissibly functional.272
There are several explanations for this phenomenon, one of which lies
in the unique nature of utility patent claims. Because of the requirement
that patentees describe their inventions in precise terms,2" the Supreme
Court historically has limited claim language to a description of what the
product is, rather than how it functions.274 Indeed, the use of functional
language in a claim can be a basis for the claim's invalidation on the
ground that it renders the claim impermissibly vague. 2" Without more,
"[t]he use of functional expressions to describe the novel features of the
' Thus, in many cases, it
invention is not in compliance with the statute."276
may be necessary to depart from the claims themselves to identify the
patentee's averments of utility.
Another explanation lies in the differences between utility under patent
law and functionality under its trade dress counterpart. As previously noted,
the concept of utility does not contemplate that a device necessarily will
function in a manner that is superior to competing devices or that it will
result in cheaper manufacturing costs.277 In contrast, "[t]o be functional, the
design or feature must be found superior or optimal in terms of engineering,
economy of manufacture, or accommodation of utilitarian function or
268. See Markman 1, 52 F.3d 967, 979-80 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (characterizing the claims
themselves, the written description portion of the specification, and the prosecution history as
intrinsic evidence properly relied upon in claim construction).
269. See In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
270. See In re Cabot Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1224, 1228 (T.T.A.B. 1990); see also In re
Edward Ski Prods., Inc., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2001, 2003 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
271. See, e.g., Inre Vico Prods. Mfg. Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 364,367-68 (T.T.A.B. 1985);
see also In re Peters, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1390, 1392 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (relying on recitations in
patents distinguishing prior art as evidence of functionality).
272. See In re Pingel Enter., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811, 1817-18 (T.T.A.B. 1998); In re BioMedicus Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1254, 1257-58 n.8 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
273. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
274. See, e.g., Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 256-58 (1928).
275. See, e.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 12 (1946); Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Co., 304 U.S. 364, 371-72 (1938).
276. Bowles Fluidics Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 620 F. Supp. 1297, 1307 (D.D.C. 1985).
277. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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' Although rejecting the Sixth Circuit's exclusive reliance
performance."278
upon the issue of competitive necessity, the Supreme Court did not
otherwise disapprove of the theory that "the policies underlying the
functional limitation on trademark protection explicitly invoke an inquiry
into competitive fairness."279 Because "the benefits afforded by a particular
design do not themselves determine whether that design is functional; a
design is functional only if those benefits cannot practically be duplicated
through the use of other designs."2 ' Utility alone (whether established
through reference to the disclosure of a related patent or by other evidence)
may not carry the day for defendants.281 Indeed, this point is implicit in the
element is one that is .'essentialto the
Court's observation that a functional
282
use or purpose of the article.'
Moreover, not only has functionality historically been treated as a
factual inquiry,283 it is one that in many cases has turned on an application
of various multifactored tests that take into account considerations other
than utility patent claims. Although there is no universal standard for
functionality, a characteristic test is the one set forth in In re MortonNorwich Products Inc.,284 which, in addition to the existence of a utility

278. W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 344 (7th Cir. 1985).
279. Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
280. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. b. (1995).
281. As the Tenth Circuit has explained:
Despite what appears to be a widespread perception that product
configurations covered by utility patents are automatically functional for Lanham
Act purposes.., this is not so. Configurations can simultaneously be patentably
useful, novel, and nonobvious and also nonfunctional, in trade dress parlance.
This is the case because to meet patent law's usefulness requirement, a product
need not be better than other alternatives or essential to competition....
... [In contrast, t]he availability of equally satisfactory alternatives for a
particular feature, and not its inherent usefulness, is often the fulcrum on which
Lanham Act functionality analysis turns.
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1506-07 (10th Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted); see also Empi, Inc. v. Iomed, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1159, 1164 (D. Minn. 1996)
("The fact that the shape of [the] plaintiff's product or any other feature serves a utilitarian function
does not necessarily undermine the product's legally recognizable trade dress.").
282. TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1255, 1261 (2001) (quoting Inwood
Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982) (emphasis added)).
283. See, e.g., Epic Metals Corp. v. Souliere, 99 F.3d 1034, 1037 (11th Cir. 1996); Ferrari
S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1246 (6th Cir. 1991);
Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513,521 (10th Cir. 1987); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's
B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 843 (9th Cir. 1987); CIBA-GEIGY Corp. v. BolarPharm. Co., 747
F.2d 844, 850 (3d Cir. 1984); Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J.Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 775 (9th Cir.
1981).
284. 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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patent, considers the nature of the claimant's advertising, the existence of
viable alternative designs, and economies of manufacture as relevant
factors for consideration.285 Factors considered by other courts also include
the inherent utility of a design,286 the relationship between the claimed
elements and the success of the associated goods or services, 28 7 and the
plaintiffs intent in adopting its design.288 As a consequence, the
significance of a utility patent to trade dress validity inquiries always had
been vulnerable to being outweighed by other factual showings.289 Thus, the
TrafFix Court properly undertook an examination of whether a single
spring design would have worked as effectively, as well
as whether a triple
290
spring design would have resulted in additional cost.

Likewise, functionality analysis prior to TraFix presupposed that as
product designs become more functional, they become closer in
appearance."' In some cases, therefore, a finding of functionality may lie
292
if there is one "best" design that realistically may be used by competitors.
In others, however, "[iut is sufficient that the design [the trade dress
claimant] seeks to [protect] is one of a few superior designs, or that the
' In contrast, the concept of
number of alternative designs is limited."293
utility is not necessarily so tied to converging designs. Indeed, the doctrine
of equivalents expressly recognizes the possibility that two designs may be
arranged
in entirely different manners and yet still embody the same
294
utility:

285. Id. at 1340-41.
286. See, e.g., Merchant & Evans v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 634 (3d Cir.
1992).
287. See, e.g., Indus. Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Ltd., 725 F.2d 18, 19-20
(2d Cir. 1984).
288. See, e.g., Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. FruehaufCorp., 536 F.2d 1210,1218 (8th Cir. 1976);
In re Jockey Int'l, Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 579, 582 (T.T.A.B. 1976).
289. See, e.g., Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1989); In re
Keyes Fibre Co., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 730, 733 (T.T.A.B. 1983).
290. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1255, 1261 (2001).
291. Ifthe parties to an infringement suit are making use ofthe most efficient designs possible,
with no non-utilitarian features, their configurations will, by definition, be identical.
292. See, e.g., Tyco Indus. v. Tiny Love, Ltd., 914 F. Supp. 1068, 1082 (D.N.J. 1996); see also
In re Carr-Griff, Inc., 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 359, 360-61 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (rejecting application to
register applicant's configuration on ground that design was "preferred" alternative).
293. Greenhouse Sys., Inc. v. Carson, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1748, 1754-55 (T.T.A.B. 1995);
see also In re Caterpillar Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1335, 1341 (T.T.A.B. 1997); In re Lincoln
Diagnostics Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1817, 1825 (T.T.A.B. 1994); In re Vico Prods. Mfg. Co.,
229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 364,368 (T.T.A.B. 1985); In re Avocet, Inc., 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 566, 56768 (T.T.A.B. 1985).
294. See generally Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
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Claims may be capable of reading on many devices of
strikingly different configuration. Thus, even the fact that the
claims read on two commercial devices in the marketplace is
not support in itself for a finding that one is a copy of the other
or confusingly similar thereto for [trade dress infringement]
purposes."'
In light of the myriad of potential problems associated with the
application of a per se rule that disclosure of a feature in a patent
necessarily renders that feature functional, the question arises whether such
a rule would simplify the federal trade dress doctrine at all. Specifically,
how is it possible to determine as a purely legal inquiry whether a trade
dress claimant's design lies within the scope of a related utility patent when
that inquiry by its nature necessitates a departure from the four comers of
the patent? What becomes of the historically factual nature of the
functionality inquiry? What precisely is the nature of the relationship
between functionality and utility in the two contexts?
The answer to these questions lies in federal utility patent law. Indeed,
although focusing on the plaintiff's patents, the TrafFix Court's opinion
was notable for its failure to apply or even acknowledge the existence of
well-established doctrinal rules governing the proper interpretation of
utility patents. In particular, the Court neglected to refer to its own
recognition in Markman Hlthat the existence of infringement in the utility
patent context-i.e., the comparison of the patent's claims to the accused
device-is afactualinquiry subject to the Seventh Amendment's strictures.
What is more, as both the Federal Circuit and the Court itself noted in that
litigation, this methodology is one that has not been seriously disputed in
the two centuries since the initial enactment of federal patent legislation.2 "
Although construction of the disclosure of a related utility patent may
well present a question of law, it remains necessary to apply that disclosure
to the reality of the marketplace. Under the TrafFix model, a determination
of the significance of a plaintiffs utility patent claims in the trade dress
context obviously does not require an application of the claims to the
defendant's device. Rather, it entails a comparison of the claims to the
plaintiff's own product, which for all practical purposes becomes the
"accused device" at issue. Indeed, to reiterate, the TrafFix Court's holding
of functionality rested on its determination that the plaintiffs product was
"covered by" its utility patent claims.297

295. Cable Car Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
overruled on other grounds, Midwest Indus. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (en banc).
296. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
297. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1255, 1261 (2001).
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The methodology is the same, however, and there is no readily apparent
reason why ownership of the device to which the claims are being
compared is a detail of constitutional magnitude that might alter the
Seventh Amendment's mandates. In other words, if the comparison of a
patent's claims to a defendant's device is a factual inquiry, the
corresponding comparison to the plaintiffs own device must be as well.
Particularly in light of the use in commerce prerequisite, the inherent nature
of the inquiry into the scope of a plaintiffs trade dress rights renders it
impossible to determine the degree to which a claimed trade dress in the
marketplace corresponds to the disclosure of a related utility patent without
departing from the patent's express text and referring to the claimed design.
In Markman I, the Supreme Court recognized that just such a departure
created a factual issue properly allocated to a jury; by departing from an
exclusive focus on the utility of the plaintiff's device, as demonstrated by
the plaintiffs utility patent claims, the Court apparently unknowingly
reached the same result in TrafFix.
VIII. THE POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF MARKMAN IN
TRADE DRESS LITIGATION

A. Implementation of Markman in Trade DressLitigation
Involving Related Utility Patents
The thesis advanced by this Article, namely that the rules governing the
interpretation and application of claims in the utility patent infringement
context properly should play a role in trade dress infringement cases
involving the disclosure of related utility patents, is not one drawn from
existing reported opinions. Indeed, there is only one apparent example of
a federal appellate opinion clearly applying any aspect of the Markman
cases in a trade dress dispute, that of the Seventh Circuit in Thomas & Betts
Corp. v. PanduitCorp.298 Thomas & Betts presented a tortured procedural
history that produced three opinions from the Seventh Circuit,2 99 the last of
which is of greatest relevance to this article. The trade dresses at issue were
the configurations of cable ties, devices used to secure and bundle wires. 0 '
The plaintiff had secured a utility patent covering a two-piece cable tie that
expired over a decade before the onset of litigation." 1 When the defendant
introduced competing products that were "essentially identical" to the ones

298. 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1607 (7th Cir. 1994), laterproceedings,65 F.3d 654 (7th Cir.
1995), on remand, 935 F. Supp. 1399 (N.D. II!. 1996), rev'd, 138 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 1998).
299. Thomas & Betts, 138 F.3d at 282.
300. Id.
301. Id.
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underlying the expired patent, the plaintiff sued under a variety of unfair
competition theories.3 2
Following some largely procedural jousting over the plaintiff's
entitlement to a preliminary injunction, the magistrate judge assigned to the
case entered summary judgment in the defendant's favor in part under a
patent bargain analysis.3 3 The grounds for dismissing the case were
broadly stated. According to the magistrate, "[t]he subject of an expired
utility patent which is disclosed as the 'best mode' in the patent cannot be
the subject of trademark protection 30 4 and therefore, "[a]s a matter of law,
a product configuration that is claimed or otherwise disclosed within an
expired utility patent is not entitled to trademark protection."3 "5
On the plaintiff's appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit vacated entry of
summary judgment and remanded the case for trial.3" 6 The appellate court's
initial analysis was at least a tacit application of the patent bargain model,
albeit one that resulted in a more narrow interpretation of that bargain than
the magistrate had found. The Seventh Circuit broadly invoked Markman
Ilto conclude that the Supreme Court's decision authorized it to review the
magistrate's interpretation of the plaintiff's utility patent on a de novo
basis.30 7 Consistent with Markman I, the court reached its own conclusions
about the scope of the patent without the benefit of any extrinsic evidence.
Specifically, the court noted that the primary focus of the plaintiff s trade
dress claims was the oval head of its ties, a shape that the court determined
was not covered by the patent's express claims. 308 As a result, "because the
oval shape of the head is not part of the claims of the patent, the appropriate
test to apply in determining whether [the defendant's] ties infringe on
is that which applies in any other trade dress
T&B's rights in the oval3shape
9
...infringement case.' 0
It was in the application of this test, i.e., functionality, that the appellate
court's methodology took a different turn. Having disposed of the
plaintiff s trade dress claims in its patent bargain analysis, the magistrate
additionally had held the plaintiff s design functional as a matter of law, in
substantial part because of the plaintiff s utility patent claims.310 Once
again, the Seventh Circuit took issue with this reliance.31 ' This time,

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id.
Id.
Thomas & Betts, 935 F. Supp. at 1409
Id. at 1410.
Thomas & Betts, 138 F.3d at 282.
Id.
Id. at 290-91.
Id.
Id. at282.
Id. at 289.
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however, the appellate court did not hold the relevant analysis to be subject
to de novo determination on appeal, but instead concluded that:
The district court also mentioned that the oval shape was
contained in the... patent and thus serves as evidence of
functionality. While this is true, it is also true that "[a] utility
patent must be examined in detail to determine whether or not
the disclosed configuration is really primarily functional or
just incidentally appears in the disclosure of a patent." The
district court found that because the oval shape was part of the
patent and did not appear incidentally, it was primarily
functional. This finding necessitated a weighing of the
evidence, however, and the finder of fact should decide, in
light of the other evidence presented, how much weight the...
patent should receive.312
Taken together, the Seventh Circuit's two holdings, however cursory
they may be, demonstrate a synthesis of utility patent and trade dress
doctrine that has been lacking in virtually all other cases to address the
relationship between the two, including TraJix. Although invoking the
Markman cases to conclude that it was entitled to determine the scope of
the patent's claims in a de novo examination, the Seventh Circuit did not
attempt to determine as a matter of law whether the actual product in the
marketplace in which the plaintiff claimed trade dress protection might
have been "covered by" the patent's constructed claims. On the contrary,
that determination was left to the trier of fact. To be sure, this latter holding
was not expressly grounded in the Markman teachings, as the appellate
court's first holding had been. It nevertheless was more consistent with
those teachings than other opinions had been and have been since.
How, then, might TrafFix have been decided under this methodology?
At the outset, and consistent with the plaintiff's original "business sign"
product, both the claims and the specifications of the plaintiff's utility
patents appear to have contemplated the support of a rectangular sign frame
mounted with one of its shorter sides parallel to the ground. 13 Thus, one
representative claim of the eight presented by the plaintiff s patents recited:
What I claim as my invention is:
3. A display device comprising an unanchored base, said
base comprising a pair of spaced-apart generally parallel

312. Id. at 300 (quoting I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ONTRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 6:10 (4th ed. 1996)).
313. An example of the business sign type of product may be found at
http://www.mdiworldwide.com/cus-b-wl.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
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elongated ground-engaging members, a pair of spaced-apart
coil springs extending upwardly from the base, and upstanding
frame structure secured to and supported solely by the upper
ends of the springs, said frame having a relatively large
surface area for receiving display indicia ....
s14
The plaintiff's triumph in its earlier infringement action against the third
party.15 rested on its demonstration that claims such as this reached the
"traffic control" design in which the spring coils were closer together than
in the "business sign" design, but apparently still not touching. 3 6 Although
this past success proved to be the basis of the TrafFix Court's conclusion
that "the [traffic control] products here at issue would have been covered
by the [plaintiff's] expired patents, ' 317
" reliance on the prior litigation hardly
was necessary. Rather, in the absence of verbiage restricting references to
a "spaced apart" configuration to springs removed from each other by a
certain distance, the Court might well have invoked Markman Iand simply
examined the text of the plaintiffs claims to determine that the phrase
carried its ordinary meaning, i.e., springs with a space in between them.318
In particular, there were and remain no doctrinal obstacles to a
determination as a matter of law that the patents' utilitarian claims swept
in all 1configurations
featuring noncontiguous springs on different vertical
39
axes.
Of course, the proposition that the plaintiffs utility patent claims should
have been construed as a matter of law, without reference to extrinsic
evidence, does not mean that the plaintiff's prior contrary position in the
earlier litigation had no role to play in disposing of its allegations. The
mechanism for injecting these considerations, however, should have been
the equitable doctrine ofjudicial estoppe 32 °rather than a flawed application

314. U.S. Patent No. 3,646,696 (issued March 7, 1972) (emphasis added).
315. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
316. For an example of the spring configuration of the plaintiff's own traffic control sign, see
http://www.mdiworldwide.com/tra-w-wi.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
317. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 1255, 1261 (2001).
318. See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1664 (3d ed.
1996) (defining "spaced" as "to organize or to arrange with spaces between").
319. See generally Louisville Bedding Co. v. Perfect Fit Indus., 151 F. Supp. 181, 822 (W.D.
Ky. 2001) ("[T]his court declines to interpret the term 'spaced apart,' where it appears in the claim
language, as requiring anything more than that the [elements in question] be separate and not
touching ....
"); ADC Telecomms., Inc. v. Thomas & Betts, 170 F. Supp. 2d 879, 884 (D. Minn.
2001) (interpreting claim referencing "spaced apart" elements to encompass arrangement allowing
"some measure of unrestricted passage" between them).
320. As one court has explained:
Judicial estoppel is a doctrine whereby a party is estopped from asserting a
proposition in the present proceedings merely by the fact of having alleged or
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of claim construction methodology. A litigant need not have prevailed in
its earlier arguments to be judicially estopped from taking a latter
inconsistent position,3 21 but judicial estoppel obviously is "more
appropriate" in cases presenting such a fact pattern.322 As the Supreme
Court noted as early as 1895, "where a party assumes a certain position in
a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not
thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary

position....""
In any case, the constructed claims might then have been applied to, and
compared with, the design to which the plaintiff actually asserted trade
dress rights. Properly undertaken, however, this exercise would not have
been the pseudo-legal inquiry undertaken in a virtual vacuum by the
TrafFix Court or by the Tenth Circuit in Vornado. Oft the contrary, it would
have been a factual one, not only because functionality is inherently an
issue of fact,324 but also because of the role played by evidentiary factors
other than pure utility,32 the consideration of which, of course, was not
necessarily foreclosed by the Court's opinion in TrafFix.

admitted in his pleadings in a former proceeding under oath an allegation to the
contrary. The doctrine is applicable despite the fact that the party asserting it was
not involved in the earlier proceeding.
Bregman v. Alderman, 955 F.2d 660, 664 n.3 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rebhan, 842 F.2d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 1988)
("The doctrine ofjudicial estoppel is directed against those who would attempt to manipulate the
court system through the calculated assertion of divergent sworn positions in judicial proceedings."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
321. See, e.g., Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982).
322. Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 899 (4th Cir. 1992).
323. Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895). A refusal to allow a patentee to limit the
scope of its claims also might be justified pursuant to "marking estoppel." Under this doctrine, a
party that markets a product bearing a notice that the product is covered by a extant patent may be
barred from later arguing that the same product does not fall within the patent's scope. See
generally5ADONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUMONPATENTS § 18.06[1][e] (2001 ed.). Although marking
estoppel most often is applied in cases in which a former licensee of the patentee seeks to escape
the payment of royalties in a subsequent suit by the patentee, see, e.g., Gridiron Steel Co. v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 361 F.2d 791, 797 (6th Cir. 1966), it has made limited appearances in
trademark cases. See, e.g., Collis Co. v. Consol. Mach. Tool Corp., 41 F.2d 641,645 (8th Cir. 1930)
("The plaintiff, having enjoyed the benefits of the monopoly protected by this patent, cannot
consistently now be heard to say that in fact the device manufactured and sold by it was not the
device so patented."). Nevertheless, the viability ofthe doctrine has been questioned, see, e.g., High
Frequency Prods. v. Wynn's Climate Sys., Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1515 (S.D. Fla. 1995), aff'd, 91 F.3d
167 (Fed. Cir. 1996), and its applicability to the trade dress context, in which a defendant would
seek to bind aplaintiff,is unclear.
324. See supranote 283 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 284-304 and accompanying text.
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This is not to suggest, of course, that all trade dress cases presenting a
specter of a related utility patent necessarily should go to the jury. As with
any factual issue, both the utility patent infringement analysis and the trade
dress functionality inquiry may be resolved as a matter of law under, for
example, either a summary judgment standard326 or the clearly erroneous
standard of review generally applicable to the appellate review of factual
determinations.327 Indeed, even if factors other than the content of the
TrafFix plaintiffs patents had been considered, its claim of
nonfunctionality likely still would have been an outstanding candidate for
summary disposition. Relatively few overall product configurations will
qualify as nonfunctional, and this number is even fewer where designs
addressed by the disclosure of related utility patents are concerned.328 The
adoption of procedural rules aimed at guaranteeing such a result, however,
is an inappropriate use of the judicial process.
B. PotentialDrawbacks to an Implementation of Markman in the
Trade Dress Context
The reasons for courts' failure to apply the teachings of Markman in
trade dress litigation involving related utility patents have not been the
subject of judicial explication. Nevertheless, although applications of
Markman would undoubtedly have the salutary effect of reconciling a
number of aspects of federal utility patent and trade dress law, the
importation of current utility patent doctrine just as undoubtedly would
cause tensions of other sorts.
To begin with, one potential obstacle to such an application is that it
would raise difficult questions of appellate jurisdiction. Although the
Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals involving patent law
issues,329 this hegemony does not extend to questions arising under either
the Lanham Act or the common law of unfair competition. 330 Likewise, the
regional circuit courts of appeal traditionally have applied their own law in
functionality inquiries, even those in which the claims of a utility patent are
326. See, e.g., Greenhouse Sys., Inc. v. Carson, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1748 (T.T.A.B. 1995)
(considering summary judgment of functionality based in part on related utility patent).
327. See, e.g., Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing

district court's finding of nonfunctionality).
328. In re Shenango Ceramics, Inc., 362 F.2d 287,292 (C.C.P.A. 1966) ("The patent is taken
only as some evidence, here conclusive, that the involved... configuration is indeed functional.
Thus the result here is not dependent on the precise scope of the patent claims.").
329. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000).
330. See, e.g., Oddzon Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
("Because trade dress issues are not unique to the exclusive jurisdiction of this court, we defer to
the law of the regional circuit in which a district court sits."); Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes
Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("When considering issues which are not unique
to our jurisdiction we defer to the law of the regional circuit.").
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implicated. 33 ' As a result, there may be little reason for a regional circuit to
supplant its own law with Federal Circuit jurisprudence such as the latter
court's treatment of extrinsic evidence in Markman L Since the regional
courts of appeals routinely apply the functionality doctrine in cases in
which no utility patent is presented, it is difficult to determine why they
might perceive themselves as losing this competence when presented with
such a patent.
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit may be uncomfortable with the idea
of the regional circuit courts interpreting and applying the disclosure of
related utility patents in trade dress cases. Prior to 1999, that court
traditionally deferred to the regional circuits when hearing cases bearing on
the relationship of utility patent law to other federal law regimes.332 In that
year, however, the court held in an en banc opinion in Midwest Industries,
Inc. v. Karavan Trailers,Inc.333 that it would thereafter develop and apply
its own law. As the court explained in reaching this holding, "to fulfill our
obligation of promoting uniformity in the field of patent law, it is equally
important to apply our construction of patent law to the questions [of]
whether and to what extent patent law preempts or conflicts with other
causes of action. 334 Coupled with the court's observation that "as the sole
appellate exponent of patent law principles this court should play a leading
role in fashioning the rules specifying what patent law does and does not
foreclose by way of other legal remedies," 3 this holding suggests that the
Federal Circuit may soon attempt to claim responsibility for all matters
bearing upon the scope of utility patents. The reaction to such a
development by the Supreme Court and the regional circuit courts would
remain to be seen. Critically, however, the Supreme Court recently has
agreed to decide the issue of whether the Federal Circuit enjoys the
jurisdiction to hear trade dress cases in which no affirmative patent claim
has been asserted.336 Consequently, there may well be no jurisdictional
obstacles in the long run to applications of the Markman cases by the
regional circuit courts of appeals.
Second, and arguably of greater concern, characterizing claim
construction in trade dress cases as a legal exercise obviously can lead to
increased scrutiny of district court opinions by appellate courts. Indeed, at
one point, the Federal Circuit's rate of reversal of claim constructions

331. See, e.g., Disc Golf Ass'n v. Champion Discs, Inc., 158 F.3d 1002, 1005-10 (9th Cir.
1998); Thomas & Betts v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 297-300 (7th Cir. 1998).
332. See, e.g., Cable Elec. Prods. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
333. 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
334. Id. at 1360.

335. Id. at 1361.
336. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 2001 WL 712760 (Fed.
Cir. June 5, 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 510 (2001).
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approached forty percent.3" One Federal Circuit judge has described the
resulting uncertainty to litigants with the following observation:
[T]he current Markman I regime means that the trial court's
early claim interpretation provides no early certainty at all, but
only opens the bidding. The meaning of a claim is not certain
(and the parties are not prepared to settle) until nearly the last
step in the process.... To get a certain claim interpretation,
parties must go past the District Court's Markman I
proceeding, past the entirety of discovery, past the entire trial
on the merits, past post trial motions, past briefing and
argument to the Federal Circuit-indeed past every step in the
entire course of federal litigation, except Supreme Court
review. In implementation, a de novo review of claim
interpretations has postponed the point of certainty to the end
of the litigation process .... "'
There is a serious question, however, over whether this consideration is
an inherent drawback to the Markman methodology or, alternatively,
whether it is the result of the methodology's misuse. Appellate review of
any sort by the Federal Circuit has tended in recent years towards an
absence of appreciable deference to the tribunal of first resort.339 For
example, although the majority rule is that trademark law's likelihood of
confusion test is a factual inquiry, the Federal Circuit is virtually alone in
337. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J.,
dissenting in part).
338. Id. (Rader, J., dissenting in part).
339. See, e.g., Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (characterizing
question of public use of patented device as a legal inquiry subject to de novo review). As two
patent practitioners have noted:
Almost since its inception, the Federal Circuit has been dogged with criticism for
straying from the path carefully delineated for appellate tribunals. Disappointed
litigants and commentators alike have criticized the court for fact-finding and
other forms of hyperactive judging. Increasingly, the bar is expressing concern
over the court's... willingness to take over the roles of patent examiner, advocate
and trier of fact.
William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal Circuit's
Discomfort With Its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 729-30 (2000) (footnotes
omitted); see also Ted D. Lee & Michelle Evans, The Charade: Trying a Patent Case to All
"Three" Juries,8 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 14 (1999) ("[W]hen the Federal Circuit believes that
the jury verdict was wrong, it substitutes its opinion for that of the jury and simply states that the
substantial evidence test was not met."); Douglas A. Strawbridge et al., PatentLaw Developments
in the United States CourtofAppealsfor the FederalCircuitDuring1986,36 AM. U. L. REV. 861,
875 (1987) ("The Federal Circuit has had considerable difficulty adjusting to its role as a court of
appeals under Rule 52(a).").
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treating the issue as a purely legal one.34 Indeed, even when hearing
appeals in which it is obligated to apply the law of the regional circuits, the
court's examination of factual issues often is more akin to a de novo
review.34 Not all appellate courts are so inclined to review their own
opinions as the "main event" in a case,342 however, and the Supreme Court
recently has taken steps to reign in the Federal Circuit's overexpansive
view of its own role in litigation.343 Consequently, the excessive rate of
reversal of district courts' construction of patent claims at the hands of the
Federal Circuit may well prove not to be characteristic of the federal
judiciary as a whole. 344

340. See supra note 247.
341. See, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(reversing finding of likely confusion between parties' trade dresses, notwithstanding record
evidence clearly supporting district court's verdict of infringement).
342. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517,1520 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Newman, J., dissenting
from order denying en bane review) ("In the resolution of disputes the trial is the 'main event,' hot
a 'tryout on the road...."' (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)).
343. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150(1999) (holding that Federal Circuit must comply
with appellate review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act when hearing appeals from
Patent and Trademark Office factual determinations).
344. As one district court has sardonically remarked of the unique nature of Federal Circuit
methodology:
The apparenttension results from afundamental difference in orientation between
the Federal Circuit and the ninety-four district courts that it supervises. The
Federal Circuit . . . is akin to the civil code courts of the European
community .... Its emphasis is on the careful delineation of ever more explicit
and detailed rules, a "patent code," if you will. Although it recognizes that quasistatutory rulemaking necessarily runs the risk of over- and under-inclusion, it sees
as paramount "the need for certainty as to the scope of patent protection." Such
"certainty aids both the public and the patentee in ascertaining the true scope and
value of the patent without having to resort to litigation to obtain a case by case
analysis.. .. "
In contrast, "litigation" and "case by case analysis" is the very raison d'etre
of the district courts. Courts of statutory jurisdiction, which embody America's
rich common law tradition, daily bring to expressive life for juries of common
sense America's broadest philosophic legal concepts .... Although this hands-on
judicial law teaching is central to the proper working of ourjury system under the
Seventh Amendment... it is only peripheral to the exposition and application of
the patent law today.... Small wonder, then, that intellectual tension exists as the
court of the future struggles to impose its vision and to shape the views of those
courts that rightly consider themselves the prime guardians of the most vital
expression of direct democracy in America today-the jury of the people.
Control Resources, Inc. v. Delta Elecs., Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 121, 124-25 (D. Mass. 2001) (quoting
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 575 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc))
(citations omitted).
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Finally, both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit conspicuously
failed in their respective Markman opinions to identify the point in
infringement proceedings at which district courts should undertake to
construct any claims at issue. As a consequence, district courts have
differed dramatically in their approaches to the issue. Claim construction
exercises have taken place at such varied times as during the pendency of
a preliminary injunction motion,3 45 prior to the beginning of the discovery
period,346 as part of the disposition of the parties' motions. for summary
judgment,3 47 and in connection with post-trial motions for JMOL or for a
new trial.3 4' District courts are equally divided in their perceptions of
whether there is a need for "Markman hearings" as part of the claim
construction process, 349 or whether claim construction properly can rest on
the parties' written submissions alone.35
Once again, however, the currently haphazard and often ad hoc nature
of the claim construction process is not necessarily an inherent
characteristic of the Markman methodology. For example, the Northern
District of California has responded to the absence of guidance from above
by adopting local rules governing the timing of the procedure.35 ' By the
same token, there is nothing to prevent either the Supreme Court or the
Federal Circuit from addressing these issues in the future. Until such an
event occurs, however, these aspects of the prospective importation of
Markman into the trade dress context inevitably would cause the same
degree of uncertainty as they have in utility patent infringement.
IX. CONCLUSION
It may be true, as one member of the Court remarked during oral
argument, that the plaintiff's past litigation positions on the scope of its
patents rendered TrafFix an "easy" case, but similarly easy cases are few
and far between.352 Although the Court's disposition of the case on the

345. See, e.g., Int'l Communication Materials, Inc. v. Ricoh Co., 108 F.3d 316,318-19 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
346. See, e.g., Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Science & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803-04 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
347. See, e.g., Voice Techs. Group, Inc. v. VMC Sys., Inc., 164 F.3d 605, 612 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
348. See, e.g., Signtech USA Ltd. v. Vutek Inc., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1741, 1742 (W.D. Tex.
1997), affd in part and rev'd in part, 174 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
349. See, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (noting, with apparent approval, pre-trial hearing on proper construction of patent's
claims).
350. See, e.g., Moll v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(interpreting six of eight claims on basis of evidentiary submissions from parties).
351. See CAL. FED. R. CT., PATENT L.R. 1-2, 2-1, 2-5, 3-5, 3-6, 3-8, 4-1, 4-4.

352. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., No. 99-1571, 2000 U.S. TRANS
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merits certainly is correct, its failure to recognize the complexity of the
inquiry in more typical cases into whether a plaintiff's design is "covered
by" a related utility patent leaves unresolved a number of issues. As a
consequence, rather than being the last word on the subject, the opinion is
more likely to necessitate the Court revisiting the issue again the future.
In particular, by failing to recognize the potential applicability ofits past
holding in Markman I, the Court missed an opportunity in TrafFix to adopt
a preexisting body of law, ready made for the occasion. A refusal to allow
a trade dress plaintiff to contradict or alter the meaning of unambiguous
utility patent claims through the use of extrinsic evidence would likely
reduce the chances of forum shopping among legal regimes as effectively
as the approach taken by the Court. By the same token, recognition that
under Markman 11 an evaluation of the significance of a related utility
patent is a discrete factual inquiry would provide a principled framework
for comparing the patent's disclosure to a design upon which a plaintiff's
allegations of trade dress protection are based. It also would justify the
Court's tacit abandonment in TrafFix of its past applications of the per se
patent bargain model of trade dress invalidity.
In light of the federal courts' experience with the Markman
methodology since the opinions of the Federal Circuit and the Supreme
Court in that case, an extension of Markman's principles into the trade
dress context obviously would not provide a panacea for all methodological
debates in the area. Indeed, as this Article has noted, Markman hardly has
led to uniformly applied rules even in utility patent infringement
litigation.353 Nevertheless, adoption of the standards advanced by this
Article would reduce inconsistencies in the treatment of utility patent
claims by the patent and trade dress regimes. If clear rules govern the
determination of whether a defendant's product falls within the scope of a
utility patent, there is no readily apparent reason why they should not be
equally applicable to an inquiry into the relationship between the patent and
the plaintiffs own product. Whatever the outcome of such a procedure
might be in individual cases, recognition that the two contexts present
analogous, if not identical, issues would streamline disposition of disputes
over the proper weight to be accorded to utility patent claims in trade dress
cases while at the same time providing a more uniform treatment of this
complex area of the law.

LEXIS 79, at * 14 (U.S. Nov. 29,2000) ("In this case it may be easy, but the question is, what about
the rule?").
353. See supra notes 329-50 and accompanying text.
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